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ABSTRACT 
After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to 
stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis.  This historical 
analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to 
stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005.  Prior to and after 
the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi 
citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population.  In order to 
achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus 
for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, 
coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security.  This analysis 
evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit 
transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces.  The 
conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that 
either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level.  This study 
suggests that a distributed light-to-medium equipped ground force operating 
within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best 
able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces.  
This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills.  Necessary 
combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network 
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The purpose of this thesis is to identify effective approaches to defeat or 
contain an insurgency in a post-conflict or weak government environment.  We 
will accomplish this by using McCormick’s “Diamond Model of Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency”1 to identify successful and unsuccessful unit approaches 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 2003-2005.   
Hypothesis: Counterinsurgency operations conducted during OIF1, OIF2, 
and OIF3 were executed sub-optimally because military units responsible for 
Mosul, Ramadi and Samarra did not persistently apply the locally appropriate 
approach to successfully control2 and protect the population. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Insurgency and its tactics are not new. Joint doctrine defines an 
insurgency as an organized movement to overthrow a constituted government 
through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Counterinsurgency is the 
conglomeration of those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, 
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.3 An insurgency 
is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken 
                                            
1 Gordon H. McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, Summer 2005). Gordon McCormick is the Director of the Department of Defense 
Analysis (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) at the Naval Postgraduate School.   
2 Army and Marine Corps Doctrine on counterinsurgency states that insurgents strive to 
weaken governmental control and increase their own control.  The counterinsurgent is thus 
working to achieve control at the expense of insurgent groups.  Government control is contingent 
upon its ability to control the behavior of the population through a combination of consensual and 
coercive law enforcement.  Gordon McCormick defines control as the ability to see and 
understand what is transpiring down to the neighborhood level and influence what is seen.  This 
thesis uses McCormick’s definition of control due to its inclusion of both the ability to see and 
influence.     
3 Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel 
/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed November 20, 2006), 134, 274. 
 
2 
governmental control and legitimacy, while increasing insurgent control.  
Insurgencies normally seek to both overthrow the existing social order and 
reallocate power within the country, or to break away from state control and form 
an autonomous area.4 
 
According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (COIN): 
COIN is not an approach to war that can be classified simply as 
foreign internal defense. It features full spectrum operations, 
including stability operations, like any other campaign. The course 
of an insurgency involves significant variations in the proportion of 
effort devoted to the different types of operations by region and 
time. In all cases, however, insurgencies will not be defeated by 
simply killing insurgents. 5 
 
The proliferation of non-state actors attempting to undermine state 
authority is characteristic of the Contemporary Operating Environment.  Military 
professionals must honestly assess performance in counterinsurgency and be 
open to new ideas.  Military professionals may be required to make course 
corrections to achieve success, or adjust plans based on political considerations.   
The approaches used at the neighborhood level during military operations 
associated with OIF1 through OIF3 were variable and at times sub-optimal.   The 
Coalition was unable to identify the potential for insurgency in Iraq, because it 
misunderstood the population. This misunderstanding prevented forces from 
applying a centralized counterinsurgency strategy, executed in a decentralized 
manner at the neighborhood level.  This was critical to the insurgency’s growth 
and survival, enabling it to grow faster than U.S. forces could adjust. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis studies post conflict security operations aimed at achieving the 
stability of three very different cities in three varied regions of Iraq.  This is a 
                                            
4Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2006), 1-1. 
5 FM 3-24, 1-3. 
3 
historical analysis of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq from 2003 through 
2005. The authors used case studies of brigade sectors in Iraq from 2003 
through 2005 in order to identify counterinsurgency approaches that were 
effective in gaining control of the population. The authors chose the cities of 
Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra because of their uniqueness in terms of 
demographics, units of occupation, and the capabilities of insurgent forces.  The 
time period studied was selected in order to better understand each city’s 
security environment over time.  This study attempts to show that frequent unit 
transitions lessen local expertise and interpersonal influence.  By studying these 
cities from 2003 to late 2005, the authors attempt to identify the impact of the 
aforementioned unit transitions.     
There are differences in the type and volume of data collected for these 
cities during this particular period.  Military reporting was used when available.  
When it was unavailable, open source historical data and interviews were used. 
With respect to civilian casualties incurred through coalition or insurgent violence, 
military reports acquired during this research included little data.  Thus, civilian 
websites such as The Iraq Body Count Database6 and Iraq Coalition Casualty 
Count7 were used to identify the number of civilian casualties per month over 
time.  In some cases the historical data simply does not exist, because some 
units did not collect the information the authors sought.  Interviews and 
questionnaires submitted to Soldiers and Marines who served in these cities 
were the primary tools used in the research.  Unit commanders, staff officers and 
security force advisors were queried for input based on their experience in Mosul, 
Ramadi, and Samarra.  A list showing the number of sources by duty position is 
included in the bibliographic review at the end of this thesis.  In addition, Iraqi-
                                            
6 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php 
(accessed May 15, 2006).  Casualty figures are derived from a comprehensive survey of online 
media reports from recognized sources.  
7 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/default.aspx (accessed May 15, 
2006). This site provides a list of names and a resource detailing when, where and how fatalities 
occurred. In addition to documenting fatalities, the site also maintains aggregate counts for 
wounded U.S. service members.    
4 
American civilians with recent experience living in Iraq provided an Iraqi 
perspective on the situation in these cities.  
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter I, the 
introduction, provides the background of our research. It includes a bibliographic 
review, as well as an explanation of political space, population protection and 
control, the Diamond Model of Counterinsurgency, and measures of analysis.  
Chapter II contains the analysis of counterinsurgency operations conducted in 
Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra from 2003 through 2005.  Chapter III describes 
methods used by security forces that successfully gained and maintained control 
of the population.   
 
D. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 
The primary sources used for this research were the Soldiers and Marines 
who served in Mosul, Ramadi and Samarra.  When available, interviews and unit 
reports provide the basis for assessing the actions taken by units on the ground.  
In addition, many units compiled extensive unit histories that describe their 
specific contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom.   
The authors gained insight into military operations in the city of Mosul 
through several sources. These include the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 
Chronology, which covers February 2003 until February 2004; the 3rd Brigade, 
2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) Unit History and Significant Activities, which covers 
from September 2003 until September 2004; the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry 
Division (SBCT) Historical Report, which covers October 2004 until October 
2005; and the 1-25 SBCT Irregular Warfare Presentation.8  Furthermore, 
information from Special Forces units was obtained from individual interviews 
that explained how these organizations operated and contributed to the mission 
in the city of Mosul. 
                                            
8 Jim Page, 101st Airborne Division Chronology of OIF1, January 14, 2004.  Captain Page, 
an infantry officer, served as the division historian during OIF I with the 101st Airborne Division. 
He subsequently deployed again with the101st as the unit historian in 2005 for another one year 
tour.       
5 
With respect to the city of Ramadi, unit histories from the 3rd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment; the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Valorous Unit Award 
packet; and After Action Reports from the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division 
provided significant insight. Unit reports and interviews provided detailed 
accounts of military operations.  Information from individual interviews explained 
how Special Forces units operated and contributed to the mission in Ramadi. 
In Samarra, the unit accounts from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 
the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), 
the 42nd Infantry Division (U.S. Army National Guard), and Task Force Liberty 
provided the information about military occupation of this city.  Information from 
individual interviews explained how Special Forces units operated and 
contributed to the mission in Samarra. 
 
E. THE NATURE OF COIN AND THE POLITICAL SPACE 
Insurgency is a struggle for power over a common political space between 
a state (or occupying power) and one or more organized, popularly based 
internal challengers.  The objective of the state is to retain power and defeat or 
displace its competitor(s).  The insurgency’s objective is to expand its popular 
base of support and defeat or displace the state.9  This contest between the 
counterinsurgency and the insurgency begins with the counterinsurgent as a 
force in being, while the insurgent begins as a force in development.10  To win, 
the insurgency must reverse the force ratio that defines the two competitors at 
the outset of the conflict, to the point where it can either openly defeat its 
opponent or force him to concede or withdraw. The insurgency begins the 
contest with an informational advantage, but a force disadvantage.  It can see 
security forces while remaining hidden. The counterinsurgent begins with an 
informational disadvantage, but has a force advantage.  Whichever side can fix 
                                            
9 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven Horton, Lauren Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The ‘Endgame’ 
Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28 (forthcoming). 
10 Gordon H. McCormick, “A Systems Model of Insurgency,” Department of Defense 
Analysis, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006).  
6 
its disadvantage and maintain its comparative advantage will achieve its desired 
outcome.11 
 Because the insurgency initially lacks sufficient force to challenge the 
counterinsurgent directly, it must remain underground, hidden within the 
population.  The population is critical to the insurgent because it provides the 
requisite concealment and resources for the insurgency’s survival. The 
population is important to the government, because the population is critical to 
the insurgency. Therefore, the conflict between the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent is a contest for control of the population.  Control is defined in 
this thesis as the ability to see and then influence what is seen.  The insurgency 
has the potential to exist wherever the counterinsurgency does not control.  
Because of the insurgent’s inherent ability to hide among the population, the 
counterinsurgent must gain and maintain control of the population to reveal the 
members and organization of the insurgency.   
Political space is a function of many factors that define an insurgent’s 
ability to maneuver.  These factors are geographical and sociological.  In any 
single village or neighborhood, the insurgent is constrained or enabled by terrain 
and social relationships.  The political space is finite.  To the degree that the 
counterinsurgent fills the political space, the insurgency cannot exist.  The force 
asymmetry that defines the two sides at the beginning of the contest indicates 
that successful insurgencies must evolve in size and complexity over time.  As 
this occurs, the scope and intensity of the conflict will naturally increase, 
reflecting the fact that the insurgency is gradually becoming stronger and the 
state is becoming weaker.  The more space that the counterinsurgent occupies, 
the greater ability he has to see the insurgent organization.  The insurgency then 
has three choices: he must leave, fight, or cease to operate. 
 The counterinsurgent must maintain control of the political space in order 
to prevent the growth of the insurgency.  Releasing control of the political space 
gives the insurgency room to maneuver and grow.  Even if the counterinsurgent 
is successful, the insurgency may never completely break. Its ideology may 
                                            
11 McCormick, “A Systems Model of Insurgency.” 
7 
continue to exist, but without the political space to continue its operations, the 
counterinsurgent can continue to suppress it.12 
 
F. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION 
The governmental control of a city is dependant on the degree to which 
the government is able to protect the population from violence.13 In order to 
accomplish this, the government’s security forces are legally authorized to use 
lethal force against armed opposition or criminal groups to enforce law and order.  
In order to protect the population, the counterinsurgency must control the 
population.  That is, it must be able to see what is occurring at the local level, and 
then be able to influence what is observed. Thus, counterinsurgency efforts are 
characterized by the struggle to control the population at the local level.14  When 
the counterinsurgent has control at the local level, reconstruction and political 
reforms are more likely to succeed.  Without control, reconstruction endeavors 
become difficult to implement.  When the state is engaged in operations against 
armed opposition groups, the state should strive to first achieve control at the 
local level.  Once control is accomplished, the state then gains the trust and 
confidence of the population.  Only after the state earns these key elements can 
it win the population’s hearts and minds.    
Control at the local level is about influencing behavior.  Both the insurgent 
and the counterinsurgent seek the support of the population.  This is the desired 
behavior sought by each side.  This support can be either passive or active.  The 
population’s motives for support are based on four primary factors: socialization, 
                                            
12 McCormick, “A Systems Model of Insurgency.”    
13 Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (2005): 9-11.  In this 
article, Kalev Sepp discusses how the security of the population must be assured; it is a basic 
need along with food, water, and shelter.  The article details important counterinsurgency 
operational practices that relate to human rights, law enforcement, population control, political 
processes, counterinsurgency warfare, border security, and executive authority. Kalev Sepp 
(Lieutenant Colonel, Retired) is a Professor in the Defense Analysis Department (SO-LIC) at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  As an Army Special Forces officer, Dr. Sepp served two tours as an 
advisor to the El Salvadoran Army during that country’s battle against insurgents. 
 
14 McCormick,”Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.”  
8 
pure preferences, selective incentives, and expectations. With regard to 
socialization, individuals are the product of their environment and therefore have 
a societal frame of reference.  This may be called one’s “going-in position”.  Pure 
preferences are choices one would make if they could be guaranteed anonymity.  
One’s pure preferences generally remain constant.  Expectations are based on 
the perception that past actions are predictors of future action.  Expectations 
influence people’s behavior when faced with a choice.  Behavior can be 
manipulated through selective incentives.  These incentives can be positive or 
negative and are commonly referred to as the carrot and stick.  The credibility of 
the incentives, whether positive or negative, can influence expectations.15  Thus, 
someone’s pure preference may be to support the local government, yet when 
threatened in the middle of the night by a local insurgent group, the citizen may 
stop supporting the local government if the citizen expects the threat to be a 
credible one. 
Once control is achieved and the capability to sustain control by local 
security forces is developed, external security forces can withdraw.  The ability to 
sustain control by local forces is a difficult, yet critical capability that defies simple 
assessment.  Experience has demonstrated that prior to the departure of external 
security forces, a well developed human intelligence (HUMINT) network must be 
organized.  This network supports the local security forces that are prepared to 
immediately combat any encroachment by insurgent elements.16  This condition 
must be present prior to the full departure of supporting external security forces.  
Without it, local forces are inadequately informed, thus resulting in the 
opportunity for armed groups to grow in strength at the expense of the local 
population, until they are ready for overt action against the city’s governing and 
security apparatus. 
                                            
 15 McCormick, ”Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” 
16 H.R. McMaster, (Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, July 25, 2006.  Colonel 
McMaster gave a presentation on his experience with counterinsurgency operations in Tal Afar in northern 
Iraq.  The presentation was to the World Affairs Council of Northern California.  During the presentation 
Colonel McMaster highlighted the importance of securing the population from insurgent violence and 




McCormick’s “Diamond Model of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency” 
illustrates an effective means through which an insurgent or counterinsurgent 















Figure 1. McCormick's “Diamond Model” of Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency17 
      1: Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
       2: Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
       3: Direct Action 
       4: Disruption of Opponent’s Ties with the International Community 
       5: Gaining Support from the International Community  
 
1.  Gaining Control and Support of the Population:  The counterinsurgent 
and insurgent compete to gain and then maintain control of the population.  
Whoever controls the population will be successful. Establishing control of the 
population is the first and primary approach in counterinsurgency. Control is 
                                            














achieved through a combination of consensus and coercion.  Initially small and 
weak, an insurgency is quickly forced to go underground.  The insurgency can 
remain there as long as it receives passive support from the populace.  It cannot 
survive without it.  Similarly, the counterinsurgency effort cannot succeed without 
accurate information from the populace.  Thus, the first and most direct path in a 
counterinsurgency campaign is to control the population.  By doing so, the 
people will be protected and willing to aid the government with the information 
needed to identify and influence insurgent groups.   
 
2.  Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population:  The 
counterinsurgent must drive a wedge between the population and the insurgent, 
just as the insurgent strives to disrupt the link between the counterinsurgent and 
the population.  Either side must establish control in order to gain trust and 
confidence.  Disrupting the insurgent’s ties to the population is the second 
approach in order of importance.  The second approach becomes increasingly 
apparent as the counterinsurgent establishes control over the population.  As this 
occurs, the counterinsurgent can selectively disrupt the insurgent’s ties to help 
increase his control and support from the population.    
 
3.  Direct Action: This approach directly and precisely strikes the opponent 
in order to disrupt operations, destroy or capture forces, and weaken the 
opposition’s means to continue. This approach can only be used when 
opponents can see each other.  Because the insurgent maintains an information 
advantage and remains hidden, the counterinsurgent must develop the capability 
to identify the insurgent and target him when he is exposed.  This can only be 
achieved through actionable intelligence developed as part of the first and 
second approaches in the model.18  Once the counterinsurgent can see the 
insurgent, he can selectively target insurgent networks in order to influence it in 
the desired way.    
 
                                            
18 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” 
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These tasks should be executed in order 1, 2, 3.  By using approach 1 
first, the counterinsurgent can develop the intelligence necessary to target the 
insurgency and its connection to resources. Once sufficient intelligence has been 
gained, the counterinsurgent should conduct approaches 2 and 3 as the 
opportunity presents itself. 
 
G. MEASURES OF ANALYSIS 
As previously mentioned, this analysis explores military operations in 
Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra during Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 through 
2005.  McCormick’s Diamond Model provides a framework through which 
counterinsurgency operations can be conceived, coordinated, and conducted.  
The authors used this framework to derive measures through which one can 
analyze counterinsurgency approaches. 
From Approach 1, the authors derived measures to analyze approaches to 
gain control and support of the population.   
Security Forces.  Current academic studies recommend a security force 
per civilian population ratio of between 13.26 and 20 troops/police-per-1000 
during nation-building operations.19  Peaceful populations require force ratios of 
somewhere between one and four police officers per thousand residents.  The 
United States has approximately 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand residents 
(2.3-per-1000).  Larger cities typically have higher ratios of police to population. 
For situations warranting outside intervention, the required force ratio is much 
                                            
19 James T. Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” 
RAND Review, Summer (2003), http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003 
/burden.html, (accessed October 18, 2006).  In this paper, James Quinlivan argues that 20-per-
1000 is the number troops needed for successful nation-building activities.  In establishing this 
number, the author used the U.S. experiences in Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan 
as examples.   In another study titled “Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency 
Operations,” John J. McGrath espouses a 13.26 troops-per-1,000 inhabitants ratio as a more 
historically accurate guideline using the experiences of the U.S. military in the Philippines, 
Germany, Japan, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo.  This article can be accessed from http://www-
cgsc.army.mil/carl/download /csipubs/mcgrath_boots.pdf.  While the term nation-building is often 
used to describe post-conflict reconstruction such as Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo, the term is 
more accurately described as state-building.  This is because the institutions of a state can be 
started with foreign assistance, while the characteristics that define a nation are much more 
difficult to externally influence.   
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higher. Although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, many 
successful strategies for population security and control have required force 
ratios either as large as or larger than twenty security personnel (troops and 
police combined) per thousand inhabitants. This figure is roughly 10 times the 
ratio required for simple policing of a tranquil population. 20  For this study, the 
authors use the 20-per-1000 ratio as comparative tool that helps to place the 
counterinsurgency operations in Mosul, Ramadi and Samarra in historical 
context.  We do not declare this to be a historical standard that must be met.  
Rather, given the experience of several past conflicts, this thesis seeks to 
determine how the current operation in Iraq compares. 
 
Figure 2.  Troop Density Required for Successful Nation-Building21                                             
20 Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations.”  
21 Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations.” 
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Information Gained from the Population.  The counterinsurgent’s ability 
to gain information about the insurgent through the population enables the 
counterinsurgent to effectively target the insurgent.  This measure indicates that 
the counterinsurgent understands the nature of the struggle as well as the ability 
of his intelligence gathering apparatus.  Information is acquired through the 
development of interpersonal relationships with members of the community and 
local security forces.  Counterinsurgency forces (U.S and Iraqi) that are able to 
gain the trust and confidence of the populace will be able to gather more 
accurate information on the insurgency.   
Civilian Casualties.  Protecting the population is an indicator of the ability 
to establish strong ties with the population.  A low number of non-combatants 
killed by insurgent action or counterinsurgent negligence is a measure of the 
counterinsurgent’s ability to protect the population.  Civilian casualties, whether 
caused by legitimate government forces or the insurgent, may cause the local 
population to become angry and withdraw support from the government. The 
counterinsurgent’s failure to address the issue of civilian casualties risks pushing 
the population into the arms of the insurgency. 
Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  By 
strengthening institutions and reestablishing services, the population can gain 
trust in the government as the preeminent provider of the population’s needs.   
These concepts were used to examine the counterinsurgent’s ability to build ties 
to the population.  Trust in government reflects a citizen’s assessment of the 
government’s ability to provide security and basic services.  The components of 
trust include the citizen’s assessment of the organization’s reputation, 
performance and appearance.22  Trust in government helps the citizen to 
determine how much risk to accept when faced with insurgent intimidation.  If the 
citizen trusts counterinsurgent forces to protect him and his family, then he will be 
more likely to continue to support the local government.  Initially, the population 
                                            
22 Piortr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 69-86. Defines trust as a concept that rests on someone’s assessment of another person 
or organization that helps to determine how much risk to place on that person or organization’s 
future actions.  The components of trust include reputation, performance and appearance.   
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will likely trust the government and its efforts.  If the government fails to meet the 
population’s expectations, it will lose the population’s trust.  It then becomes 
more difficult for the government to regain the population’s trust than had it met 
expectations initially.  Through effective institutions and functioning services, the 
government can gain the population’s trust and confidence.    
With regard to Approach 2, the authors analyzed coalition efforts to disrupt 
the insurgent’s control over the population.   
Insurgent Propaganda.  The battle of the story is one that must be won 
by integrity through the accomplishment of stated goals.  At the local level, 
perception is reality.  Whoever best influences local perceptions will better 
influence local expectations and behavior. If a community perceives 
counterinsurgent forces as protecting them from insurgent intimidation, then the 
community’s perception will result in behavior more supportive of government 
activities.  Thus, counterinsurgent information operations must closely reflect 
local realities in a way that best shapes local perception.  Furthermore, 
propaganda distributed by the insurgent must be discredited by the 
counterinsurgent in order to prevent community perceptions of insurgent 
influence.      
Sources of External Resources. The insurgent’s ability to extract and 
distribute resources enables the insurgency to operate and grow.  If the insurgent 
cannot extract resources from within the city, he must seek them from elsewhere.  
Resources provided from outside of the city illustrate the degree to which the 
insurgency does not have control of the population of the city.  These measures 
seek an understanding of the contest between the counterinsurgent and the 
insurgent and its impact on ties between these contestants and the populace. 
In Approach 3, the analysis explores the coalition’s ability to precisely 
target insurgent forces and disrupt their operations.   
Insurgent Casualties / Detentions resulting from Coalition 
Operations. Casualties inflicted on the insurgency and the numbers of 
insurgents that are detained indicate units’ effectiveness at approaches 1 and 2.  
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However, using the number of casualties inflicted on the insurgency or the 
number of apprehensions as a metric to determine the counterinsurgency’s 
effectiveness can be misleading.  Without knowing the total strength of the 
organization or its recruitment rate, one can only establish a rough estimate of 
attrition. This metric can, however, give insight into the counterinsurgent’s 
intelligence apparatus’ ability to positively identify insurgents and their activity, as 
well as to verify the reliability of information sources. 
U.S. Casualties / Successful Insurgent Attacks.  The number of 
insurgent attacks against security forces and the number of casualties suffered 
by security forces indicates the insurgent’s ability to operate and grow.       
There are many more analysis points that can be used to evaluate units’ 
actions in Iraq in a COIN environment.23  The authors derived these metrics from 
an analysis of existing metrics and from an analysis of those metrics that 
describe the extent to which an organization is gaining control and support of the 
population, disrupting the links between the insurgents and the population, and 
conducting effective direct action.  While necessary, it is important to understand 
that any metrics used in counterinsurgency are more subjective than quantifiable.  
Also, all data used for this analysis was derived from primary source interviews 






                                            
23 There are many metrics that in varying degrees measure governmental effectiveness and 
the strength of insurgent forces.   The number of actionable tips received from the population and 
the tone of messages broadcasted from mosques may give insight to the counterinsurgent’s 
ability to gain information from the population.  Another useful metric described by LTC Chris 
Gibson, in his article “Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: The Path Forward in Iraq,” 
Military Review, September-October (2006), advocates using the number of successful insurgent 
attacks and the number of effective insurgent attacks followed up by effective, precision targeting 
by the counterinsurgent to indicate the degree to which the counterinsurgent is able to enlist the 
support of the population in pursuing insurgent terrorists.  In many cases, these types of data 
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II. ANALYSIS OF MOSUL, RAMADI, AND SAMARRA 
A. 2003 
1. Mosul 
In April 2003, Coalition Forces seized the initiative in Mosul and were able 
to establish relative stability in the city.  After Special Forces units working with 
Kurdish militia forced Ba’ath Party security organizations to depart the city, the 
Coalition reinforced the potentially volatile northern city with additional forces. 
With the arrival of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) into Mosul, the city 
began progress toward the establishment of a functioning local government, 
security forces and businesses.  Major General Petraeus, the Division 
Commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), established three 
significant local policies that set conditions for increased stability.  The first policy 
was the prioritization of three areas that contributed to the improved public 
welfare.  They included security within the city, payments to Iraqi civil servants 
and alleviating the fuel shortage.  The second policy was to keep 2nd Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) reinforced with additional forces (+) in Mosul for the entire 
year and to make the city the organization’s main effort.24  The third policy that 
significantly increased stability was 2nd BCT’s (+) occupation of the city in 
platoon and company outposts throughout the city.  While the focus of this 
analysis is on the brigade level and below, it is important to note that the brigade 
received significant augmentation from the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters, 
staff and attached combat support battalions.  This augmentation focused on 
partnership and institution building with provincial ministries located in the city, 
thus contributing to improved governance. 
 
 
                                            
24 2nd BCT (+) consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 502nd Infantry Regiment; 
3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment; the 503rd Military Police Battalion; 1st Battalion, 320th 
Field Artillery Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 17th Cavalry Regiment; B Company, 326th Engineer 
Battalion; B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment; B Company, 311th 
Military Intelligence Battalion; B Company, 501st Signal Battalion; 526th Forward Support 
Battalion. 
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a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
Security Forces.  These three policies enabled 2nd BCT to 
establish stability in Mosul in spite of falling well below the 20-per-1000 security-
to-population guideline.25  The population of Mosul in 2003 was estimated to be 
approximately 1,700,000.  Historical guidelines suggest a population of this size 
would require a security force of approximately 34,000 troops and police (22,500 
using the McGrath study).  In Mosul, the ratio of international security forces to 
the population from late April to the end of December 2003 was approximately 6-
per-1000.26  In spite of this, a foundation of relative stability was established by 
2nd BCT.  While 2nd BCT’s surge of infantrymen into the city on April 22, 2003 
was necessary to stop looting and establish local control, institution building 
measures that began within days of the unit’s arrival were necessary follow-on 
tasks that appear to have reduced widespread popular opposition to Coalition 
efforts.  
Information Gained from the Population.  Colonel Joseph 
Anderson, the brigade commander in charge of Mosul, dictated that the 
establishment of a “stable and secure environment” was the mission of his 
organization.27  2nd BCT (+) worked to build a secure environment through 
dismounted patrolling and daily interaction with the population in 
neighborhoods.28  Infantry battalions within the city worked to accomplish this by 
operating largely from platoon and company combat outposts. Small units 
                                            
25 In order to maintain the approximate 6-per-1,000 ratio, the unit used a less concentrated 
force presence in Tal Afar, the Tigris Valley, and the Al Jazeera desert and along the Syrian 
border.  This was mitigated by the utilization of the significant helicopter assets that augmented 
the unit’s mobility and force projection.      
26 2nd BCT had approximately 6,000 soldiers under the command of Colonel Anderson.  In 
addition to divisional and attached soldiers operating in the city, the authors estimated the 
additional number of soldiers operating from the Mosul airfield and from vicinity of the Division 
headquarters to be 4,000 (this number includes division staff, the military intelligence battalion, 
the signal battalion, the engineer battalion, the division support command, 159 Aviation brigade 
headquarters, Division artillery, etc). The total of 10,000 soldiers yields a ratio of just under 6-per-
1,000.  It is possible that additional combat support and service support soldiers operated in 
Mosul that the authors have not accounted for.  If there were an additional 1,000 soldiers, the 
ratio would change to 6.4-per-1,000. 
27 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 Feb 2004” (Power 
Point briefing, Mosul, Iraq, February 2004), 7. 
28 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 Feb 2004.” 
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operating in Mosul neighborhoods helped to protect the population.  The ability to 
function and operate within a densely populated urban setting characterized the 
initial U.S. force presence in Mosul.  The use of rifle companies “immersed” in 
their respective areas of operations day and night developed local situational 
awareness in the soldiers and built strong ties with the population.29  This 
enabled U.S. forces to acquire information resulting in useful intelligence against 
organized armed opposition groups. The prominent example of information 
gained from the population involved the operation that killed Uday and Qusay on 
July 22, 2003.  Based on an Iraqi source from within the city, units from 2nd BCT 
killed the second and third most valued targets in Iraq using direct fire 
weapons.30  While the building Uday and Qusay occupied was destroyed in the 
process, no one outside of the building was injured in the operation.    
Civilian Casualties. The number of civilians targeted and killed by 
insurgent groups during the first three months of 2003 was limited.  
Assassinations did occur and were explained as being the tactics used by 
desperate Ba’athist.31 As explained by company commanders in 2nd BCT, 
platoons operated out of neighborhood patrol bases distributed throughout the 
city.  These platoon and company patrol bases or combat outposts allowed 
soldiers to patrol and engage the population in every sub-sector of the battle 
space.  The availability of 22 companies operating in this way throughout the city 
limited the ability of criminal and insurgent groups to swiftly organize and operate 
in Mosul.32  Platoons regularly conducted counter black-market operations 
throughout the city.  The ability to limit illegal activity helped to reduce the flow of 
money into the hands of groups likely to associate with insurgent groups.  
                                            
29 Paul Stanton, “Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in Transition,” Military 
Review (July-August 2006): 69, 67, 63. 
30 Page, 444-445. 
31 Page, 522. An example is the murder of Sheik Shalon in August 2003.  While insurgent 
actions may at times be desperate, attacks against city contractors, intellectuals and government 
leaders are commonly used by insurgent groups to increase their ability to influence the 
population through intimidation.  This action should not be seen as the last gasp of insurgent 
action, rather, a concerted effort to impose their will on the local population.     
32 The number of companies was determined from task organization reports and interviews 
with officers who served in Mosul.  This number includes 16 infantry companies, 3 military police 
companies, and 3 artillery batteries (these batteries conducted primarily infantry tasks). 
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Limiting the financial assets available to criminal and insurgent groups further 
helped to protect the population.  In Mosul, data shows that after a surge in 
civilian deaths in May caused by U.S. Air Force bombing, the number of civilian 
deaths in combat dropped to almost zero. An increase in November and 
December 2003 was due to insurgent and criminal violence. 
2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
Civilian 
Casualties 
0 40 0 2 0 0 3 5 6 
Table 1: Civilian Casualties in Mosul in 2003 33 
Civilian casualties caused by U.S. forces are a problem when conducting 
operations on foreign territory.  A unit’s capacity to gain the support of the 
population is affected by the unit’s record of causing civilian deaths.   The initial 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Marine units in Mosul lacked the 
manpower necessary to sufficiently address the growing concerns of the city’s 
population.34  The arrival of a reinforced brigade combat team with a division 
headquarters brought order to the streets and a plan for Moslawis to participate 
in their own political future.  According to Colonel Anderson, the precise use of 
the minimum force necessary to maintain order was essential to gaining support 
of the population.  Thus, troop leaders in Mosul under 2nd BCT kept civilian 
casualties to a minimum by emphasizing the prevention of indiscriminate fire.35  
Forces used direct fire with precision in most cases, while indirect fire and fixed 
wing close air support were not allowed in the city of Mosul. 36  The conscious 
decision to not fire artillery or drop bombs into the city demonstrates a willingness 
to take short term risk in order to achieve the longer term objective.  By 
forbidding the use of the most powerful weapons in the military’s arsenal, ground 
forces were required to engage in operations that were close range and that 
                                            
33 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
34  Interview with U.S. Army Officer serving in Mosul during 2003, September 21, 2006. 
35 Joe Anderson, (Brigadier General, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, November 10, 
2006. 
36 David Petraeus, (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, November 
20, 2006  LTG Petraeus’ guidance to subordinate commanders was based on the understanding 
that it was not logical to use indirect fire in the city.  Other, more precise, weapons were available 
in the event a target developed that U.S. or Iraqi ground forces were unable to kill or capture. 
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required precision with hand held weapons.  This is the style of fighting required 
for building the trust and confidence of the population. 37  This is the kind of 
fighting that light infantry and Special Forces soldiers are best trained to conduct.  
This practice reduced civilian casualties, thus eliminating a potential source of 
insurgent propaganda. 
  Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
The looting in Mosul in April 2003 reduced the population’s trust in the 
Coalition.38  Much of the population of Mosul initially viewed Coalition Forces as 
liberators; however, many Iraqis saw the breakdown of law and order as an 
intentional tactic used to weaken Iraq and ensure the need for a U.S. presence.  
The people of Iraq found it hard to believe that the invading forces did not have a 
plan to immediately maintain law and order at the local level.  As they saw it, the 
Ba’ath Party maintained order at the local level.  No one but the Coalition would 
be able to maintain order once the regime fell.39  In Mosul, the fall of the regime 
ushered in a period of lawlessness that was only partially contained by city 
religious leaders and U.S. Army Special Forces augmented with Marines.  
Following the arrival of 2nd BCT of the 101st Airborne Division, Major General 
Petraeus and Colonel Anderson focused Coalition efforts on establishing 
political, judicial and security institutions that gave Moslawis the ability to 
participate in running their own city. Importantly, the U.S. Commander 
immediately held city elections to create a city government and political 
organization, thus allowing the citizens to participate in their own governance.  By 
the time the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was officially established on 
                                            
37 Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s 
Perspective on Information Operation,” Military Review, (May-June 2006): 20.  This article 
provides a brigade commander’s experience in Baghdad and his realization that his focus needed 
to be more heavily weighted towards Information Operations, demonstrating to the Iraqi 
community leaders that Coalition Forces were worthy of Iraqi’s trust and confidence.   
38 Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
69-83.  In Iraq, America did not have a good reputation within the Arab community, but the 
promises made through the leaflet drop across Iraq guaranteed a better life.  The subsequent 
performance of units in Iraq reduced the people’s willingness to trust U.S. efforts.  This in turn 
makes it easier for opposition groups to recruit people into their organization.  
39 Ibrahim Marogy, in discussion with the authors, October 27, 2006.  Mr. Marogy was born 
and raised in Mosul.  He lived in Iraq until 2003.  He worked as an engineer throughout the 
country during his adult life.  He visited Mosul regularly since his family still lived there.     
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May 15, 2003, the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul was already working with 
elected local government leaders to rebuild the city and its institutions.  This 
reduced Iraqi suspicion regarding Coalition intentions to control the city outright.  
As explained by division commander General Petraeus on May 22, 2003, 
Coalition Forces immediately began to rebuild institutions and infrastructure at 
the local level: 
Our soldiers have deployed throughout our area of 
operation, securing  cities and key infrastructure facilities; helping 
the new interim city and province government get established; 
conducting joint patrols with Iraqi  policemen and manning police 
stations in the city; helping organize and secure the delivery of fuel 
and propane; assisting with the organization of  the recently begun 
grain harvest, a huge endeavor in this part of Iraq; building bridges 
and clearing streets; helping reopen schools and Mosul University; 
assisting with the reestablishment of the justice system in the area; 
distributing medical supplies; helping with the distribution of food; 
guarding archeological sites; working to restore public utilities… 40       
 
These institution-building efforts by Coalition units helped to rebuild trust.  
The performance of 2nd BCT and the direct, yet non-aggressive daytime patrol 
tactics, improved the level of trust conferred on Coalition actions in Mosul.  In 
performing the myriad of reconstruction and institution-building tasks, the key 
idea that propelled the trust building efforts of Coalition Forces was the 
partnerships established between divisional non-maneuver units or staff sections 
and their logical Iraqi government counterpart.  Examples include the division 
staff judge advocate with the Ministry of Justice, the division engineer battalion 
with the ministry of public works, the division signal battalion with the ministry of 
telecommunications, the corps support group with the Ministry of Education.  In 
helping to get the city and provincial government started, the partnerships 
established by the 101st Airborne Division were significant during 2003.41   
                                            
40 David Patreaus, “101st Airborne Division Commander Live Briefing from Iraq,” Defense 
LINK, May 13, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030513-0181.html 
(accessed October 3, 2006). 
41 Petraeus, e-mail message to authors, November 20, 2006. 
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The Commander’s Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funds provided 
$4,280,000 (USD) to the city of Mosul, while additional sources of financial aid 
added an additional $9,100,000 (USD).42  These efforts helped to rebuild trust, 
although the impact of the relief effort was lessoned by a two month period 
during which no CERP funds were available to the commanders in the field.  
Further limitations to the effectiveness of the rebuilding effort resulted from the 
reliance on civilian contractors for much of the reconstruction effort.   
The 101st Airborne Division in Mosul had to request permission to do work 
for Bechtel since the company was not intending to address a correctable 
reconstruction project for another several months.43  The availability of combat 
engineers allowed the unit to ameliorate many situations similar to this one.  In 
spite of the many efforts in Mosul to build strong ties, the lack of material support 
to provide the population with what was expected seriously impaired this effort.  
The shortage of propane and diesel was not corrected in spite of constant 
reporting that the shortage was a crisis affecting the unit’s ability to generate 
electricity and deliver food.44  The failure to support this material need 
demonstrated a shortcoming that was out of the hands of the local unit, yet 
impacted the ability of the unit to help gain support of the population. 
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population. 
Insurgent Propaganda.   Insurgents and terrorists influence the 
population through propaganda and coercion that capitalizes on cultural and 
religious ties. To target visible propaganda messages, Coalition Forces 
organized groups of city day laborers who specialized in the correction of minor 
city infrastructure problems. They limited the visible signs of insurgent 
propaganda by painting over graffiti and picking up trash.  At a minimum, these 
efforts effectively limited the amount of visible propaganda apparent to the 
population, as well as reduced a potential topic of exploitation for insurgent 
propaganda.   
                                            
42 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 February 2004,” 55.   
43 Page, 476. 
44 Page, 435, 458, 462, 466, 476,490, 505, 597, 613. 
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Messages from the city’s mosques were varied during 2nd BCT’s time in 
Mosul.  By tracking the messages that were coming from the mosques, the unit 
was able to identify areas that contained imams who preached anti-Coalition 
messages.  Unclassified data was unavailable to illustrate the level of insurgent 
propaganda that was transmitted from mosques or the number of imams who 
were supporting the insurgency.  The unit did identify and engage with the local 
religious community.  This effort was led by the unit chaplains and lasted for the 
duration of 2003.45  Like the unit’s effort to stand up and assist the city and 
provincial judiciary, engagement with local religious leaders was a key effort 
designed to influence those who influenced the populace.   
c. Direct Action 
  Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  With 22 companies of infantry and military police operating in the 
city, augmented by elements of U.S. government agencies and SOF, U.S. Army 
units in Mosul were able to attack insurgent forces during the night at will.  
Intelligence driven raids and searches of specific individuals and materials 
occurred throughout the city.  The target folder of each target included a 10 digit 
grid coordinate, name and background of the individual, and a picture of the 
target location.  In this way, units were able to verify the site with the provided 
grid.  In many cases, local Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)46 were able to confirm the 
location of the target shortly before conducting the operation.  The following chart 
summarizes the number of Iraqis detained during 2nd BCT’s operations in Mosul. 
                                            
45 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 Feb 2004,” 18.   
46 The term Iraqi Security Forces in this thesis refers to both army and police forces.  
Members of ISF were best able to conduct day and night time reconnaissance of targeted 
location due language and culture skill.  Importantly, using this technique requires close 
coordination and detailed planning with ISF.   
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2003 JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
AIF KIA 8 Unk Unk Unk 5 Unk 
AIF 
Captured 
105 100 135 120 95 295 
Table 2: AIF Killed and Captured in Mosul in 200347 
 
The raid was a typical tactical mission conducted by the maneuver 
companies in the city.  This mission was reserved for the targets considered 
most dangerous.  The cordon and search mission was typically used for targets 
with potential intelligence value or who were suspected of insurgent activity.  This 
tactic was further refined with the addition of the cordon-and-knock approach.  
This less violent and more culturally savvy technique allowed the units to pursue 
less dangerous, but potentially active members of insurgent groups without 
alienating entire neighborhoods.  Due to an increase in insurgent activity in Mosul 
during the month of December, units conducted more raids focused on killing and 
capturing insurgents.  These missions account for the increase in detentions 
during December.  According the Colonel Anderson, this surge in offensive 
operations effectively removed many former Ba’ath Party members from the 
streets of Mosul.48 
  U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  The following chart shows 
insurgent attacks and U.S. casualties.  The number of attacks increased in 
November and December.  In response, 2nd BCT conducted many more raids 




                                            
47 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 February 2004,” 37.   
48 Joe Anderson, (Brigadier General, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, November 10, 
2006. 
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2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV49 DEC 
Attacks Unk Unk 45 21 72 54 81 112 121 
US WIA Unk 0 Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk 
US KIA 0 0 0 4 3 0 1 24 4 
Table 3: Attacks and Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces in Mosul in 200350 
In addition to the out of sector raids conducted against terrorist camps, the 
city-wide nighttime raid against multiple targets simultaneously marked the 
cornerstone of this unit’s counter-guerilla effort to take the enemies of the new 
Iraq off the streets.  These precisely targeted operations were made possible by 
a functional and effective joint-interagency task force that integrated the 
collection and analysis efforts of the 101st Airborne Division’s intelligence 
battalion, special operations forces, and U.S. Government agencies.51  The 
largest of the night raids occurred in December 2003, when 23 targets were 
simultaneously killed or captured across the city.52  The operation was planned 
and synchronized at brigade level with intelligence provided from a division 
sponsored joint interagency task force. It was directed by battalion headquarters 
in each of the main four city zones, and executed at the platoon and company 
level.  As units gained more information from the targets and target locations, 
they pursued and exploited new targets that emerged.  This capability was 
employed by U.S. Army infantry units in the summer and fall of 2003 and 
continued to be employed when units maintained strong local knowledge of the 
population and terrain.  Importantly, direct action operations used to kill or 
                                            
49 More than half of these deaths (17) are attributed to a helicopter crash on November 15, 
2003.   
50 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 February 2004,” 59, 
and Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/default.aspx. 
51  Petraeus, e-mail message to authors, November 20, 2006. 
52 “2nd BCT Mosul Stability and Support Operations, 1 May 2003 – 1 February 2004,” 29. 
Operation Reindeer Games was conducted by the four infantry battalions operating in the city 
plus a SOF unit.  With one exception, every target captured was taken without any shots being 
fired.        
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capture insurgents were used to augment other efforts to influence the insurgent 
network. 53   
By the end of 2003, the relatively stable situation in Mosul was largely 
achieved by 2 BCT seizing the initiative early, and then maintaining momentum 
throughout the year. The momentum was maintained through intelligence 
gathering and institution building in the day, and insurgent targeted operations at 
night.  The day was dominated by events that were focused primarily on building 
rapport with the population and institutions, while the night focused on targeting 
insurgent and terror cells.  The organization available to do this included five 
battalions focused on providing a safe and secure environment; two battalions 
focused on training and advising local security forces (police and army); a civil 
affairs battalion focused on governance, commerce and infrastructure; and two 
combat engineer battalions dedicated to projects supported by both the city and 
the province.  There were also staff experts at the division level who worked 
along side Iraqi judicial, civil and religious leaders to help establish a functioning 
city government with responsible leaders.   
In spite of the numerous positive steps taken by Coalition Forces in Mosul, 
insurgent organization and violence increased throughout the year.  While the 
initiative seizing efforts in May and June limited the room for insurgents to 
maneuver initially, they were able to eek out an existence and still recruit 
individuals to their organization.  The inability to prevent this from occurring, in 
spite of a nuanced and skilled approach by Coalition Forces, is suggestive of 
existing conditions that made this growth more likely.  The inability to prevent 
insurgent growth may also suggest that the applied approach required additional 
resources to influence former Ba’athists to join the new political process.   
                                            
53 Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee and David Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Networks,” Carnegie 
Mellon University, Pittsburg, PA, (2002),  Understanding the result when insurgent network nodes 
are killed or captured is important when attempting to influence armed opposition groups.  An 
over reliance on killing and capturing can create multiple emergent networks that are more 
difficult to track and influence.  Sometimes, the best way to influence insurgent leaders or groups 
involved was not to kill or capture them.  Ultimately, the end state is for everyone to buy into the 
political process.  Influencing insurgent leaders to end their armed opposition is the ultimate goal.  
This requires more discipline, skill and patience.     
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2. Ramadi  
 Initially, Special Forces units arrived in Ramadi, quickly followed by a 
company from the 82nd Airborne Division.  In late April 2003, 3rd ACR arrived in 
Anbar province. It relieved a company from the 82nd Airborne Division, and 
replaced it with one troop from 2nd Squadron, the Regimental Headquarters and 
a wheeled recon platoon. 3rd ACR then received 1st Battalion, 124th Infantry 
Regiment (1-124 IN) from the Florida Army National Guard, which was primarily 
used to train the Iraqi Police.  Eventually, all of 2nd Squadron minus G Troop 
was in Ramadi for the months of June and July.  In July 2003, 2nd Squadron 
moved to Fallujah and 3rd Squadron moved a TAC and a troop to Ramadi.  The 
Regimental Headquarters and 1-124 IN remained along with the wheeled recon 
platoon.  This organization remained until September 2003, when the 1st BDE, 
1st ID (consisting of 2 battalions, and a brigade headquarters) moved into 
Ramadi along with the division headquarters for the 82nd Airborne Division.  1-
124 IN also remained with the 82nd Airborne Division in Ramadi.  This 
organization remained until units conducted a relief in place with Marines in the 
spring of 2004.  
a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
Security Forces.  The security force presence in Ramadi changed 
frequently during 2003, never reaching a 20-to-1000 troop-to-population ratio.  
The estimated population of Ramadi in 2003 was approximately 390,000.  
According to the recommended troop-to-population ratio, a population of this size 
would require a security force of 7,800 police and troops (5,170 using the 
McGrath study).  With such a frequent force rotation in Ramadi, units had 
difficulty becoming intimate with their area of operations.  This may have led to 
difficulty in gaining control.  Security forces, at their highest strength, fell well 
short of the strength considered necessary to maintain security in a post-conflict 
environment. 
Foreign counterinsurgency forces must transition responsibility for security 
to indigenous counterinsurgency forces as soon as indigenous forces are 
capable.  Units attempted to train local security forces with varying degrees of 
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success.  Units looked to co-op local police forces, but initially did not have the 
resources to train new forces while still conducting local security operations. 
Units established “neighborhood watch” systems and trained and equipped 
infrastructure police forces and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). 3rd ACR 
established the first Highway Patrol in Iraq and hired over 1,500 police officers 
and other security personnel.  They also established an ICDC training center in 
Anbar Province, eventually recruiting and training some 3,000 troops.  This 
employment not only served as a source of income to the people, but it also 
placed more of the responsibility of security into the hands of the population.54 
Information Gained from the Population.  Units were able to 
gather intelligence from the population with a limited degree of success.  When 
security forces had control in an area, the local populace appeared to be more 
willing to aid security forces.  According to one company commander: 
I found that a lot of the deployment is a credibility game with the 
public and the insurgents.  I felt the insurgents targeted units that 
they felt were weak. The public didn’t trust units that were not 
professional or couldn’t provide security or assistance (especially if 
they promised such assistance).  I was able to largely make good 
on any promise I made, which at times made me personally a 
target, but it also led to a lot of HUMINT and support from local 
leaders and ended up making the area relatively stable.55 
 
The quality of information gained from the population varied over time and 
with location.  Some of the information was accurate and some was fabricated to 
further tribal or personal agendas.  Some areas were very good about reporting 
insurgent and other criminal activity as they began to trust security forces.  When 
security forces did not have control of an area, civilians stopped giving 
information because of fear of reprisal from insurgent forces and from prisoners 
who had been released from detention. 
                                            
54 Blood and Steel!  The History, Customs, and Traditions of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, 2006 Edition (Fort Carson: Third Cavalry Museum, 2006), 39.  These figures represent 
the number of security forces that 3 ACR trained across Anbar province.  Significantly fewer 
forces were employed in Ramadi. 
55 Nick Ayers, (Captain, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, May 22, 2006. 
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The enemy is human and succumbs to patterns and routine.  Because the 
insurgency operates in the local neighborhoods, the population holds the solution 
to gaining actionable intelligence.  Actionable intelligence is verifiable information 
that can place a specific target at an exact location during a particular time, thus 
allowing deliberate planning of an operation.  This information may be time 
sensitive, requiring units to have the flexibility to react quickly.  Actionable 
intelligence is difficult to acquire.  Ideally, targets are developed from information 
gained at the lowest level, the population.  Some Army officers commented that 
their unit was often fed intelligence from division and national level sources that 
led to the planning of a deliberate operation.  If a unit routinely receives its 
intelligence about its sector from higher level intelligence sources, this may 
indicate that the unit cannot effectively see and therefore cannot control its 
sector.  It may also indicate a misallocation of intelligence gathering assets.   
Most information in Ramadi was gained through mounted and dismounted 
patrols, route clearances, reconstruction projects, and meetings with local 
leaders.  The local market often was a good place to gain information due to the 
numbers of people that congregated there and the activities that could be 
observed.  Neighborhood and city council meetings were helpful as well.  Some 
units established neighborhood tip lines that were connected directly to unit 
headquarters.  These tip lines were to be used by the locals to report criminal 
activity without risking reprisals. 
When attempting to gain intelligence from the population, units made 
extraordinary efforts to determine who was honest and who had an agenda.  
Units often reported frustration over the inability to persuade locals to give 
information.  Units learned that it was difficult to act quickly on intelligence unless 
it was well developed and the accuracy of the source could be verified.56  
Civilian Casualties.  An accurate number of Iraqi civilians killed in 
Ramadi by insurgent and other criminal activity may never be known.  According 
to the Iraq Body Count Database, there were approximately 30 civilian deaths in 
Ramadi from April 2003 through July 2003.  
                                            
56 Christopher Kennedy, (Major, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, August 6, 2006. 
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2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
Civilian 
Casualties 
22 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 2 
Table 4: Civilian Casualties in Ramadi in 200357 
 
Any civilian casualties, whether caused by legitimate government forces or 
insurgent forces, can cause the local population to become angry and withdraw 
support.  Depending on the severity and the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, the population will often choose sides to either passively or actively 
support insurgent forces.   Causing groups to hastily choose a side may force 
them toward the insurgency.  Highly kinetic approaches (kill/capture) to battle 
insurgents can cause excessive collateral damage, pushing groups away from 
the counterinsurgent.  Most units did not track civilians who were killed 
accidentally, because it was not always clear which casualties were caused by 
insurgents or which were insurgents themselves. The inability to identify non-
combatants became extremely problematic.  When units could determine that a 
non-combatant was inadvertently injured or killed by U.S. forces, they made 
sincere attempts to reconcile the incident. Most units made some sort of solatia 
payment to the family for its loss.  These incidents were often personally handled 
by unit commanders to convey their sincerity. 
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
Units attempted to reestablish government institutions and develop 
reconstruction projects.  Units worked with local contractors to reestablish 
electricity and water services, because these were the most pressing needs of 
the local population.  Unfortunately, the issue of electricity primarily stemmed 
from the looting of wires which provided electricity from the dams and power 
stations.  Securing dams and power generation sites became a priority.  Units 
had difficulty protecting hundreds of miles of wire which was continually looted.  
The inability to protect vital infrastructure hindered units’ ability to gain the trust of 
the population.  Units spent approximately $12 million (USD) on reconstruction 
                                            
57 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
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projects. Although noteworthy, these projects were small in scale and did not 
meet the expectations that the local population had for a better future.   
The 3rd ACR conducted several civil-military operations (CMO).  The first 
of these was the establishment of a Government Support Team (GST) in 
Ramadi.  The GST opened its office in the Ramadi Municipal Building in order to 
establish a relationship with the civic leaders and directors of the local 
infrastructure.  The close proximity of the GST to local leadership facilitated 
cooperation among the agencies.58 
One of the challenges facing both the GST and local government officials 
was in developing a decentralized approach to operations. This was due to the 
distance to Baghdad and local authorities’ preference for highly centralized 
control during Saddam’s regime.  In an attempt to alleviate some of this pressure, 
the Regimental Commander, Colonel David Teeples, the GST, and the staff 
provided guidance to local leaders to begin learning to operate independently.  
Colonel Teeples established bi-weekly meetings with the leadership of Anbar 
Province to help them adapt to this new system.  At these meetings, units 
communicated Coalition goals and priorities for the province.  These priorities 
were security, fuel, and employment.  Later, mayors were invited to the meetings 
in order to strengthen the cooperation between Coalition Forces and local 
leaders. 
In August 2003, when only one representative from Anbar Province was 
invited to sit on the new Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad, the people of Anbar 
Province became outraged. In order to preserve the progress that had been 
achieved, local leaders were asked to participate in a new Anbar Provincial 
Council.  Following the election of a Council Chairman and Vice Chairman, the 
council began work on resolving issues that affected the local community.  This 
was the first time women were allowed to take part in the government process.  
                                            
58 Blood and Steel!  The History, Customs, and Traditions of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, 38.  Unless stated specifically, figures represent Anbar Province. 
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The outlook for the Provincial Council was encouraging because it showed a 
democratic process could work for the citizens of Anbar Province.59 
In spite of the Iraqis’ determination to take charge of their own affairs, their 
lack of resources prevented progress.  In an effort to re-energize local 
government agencies and to get the population back to work, the GST channeled 
$60 million (USD) to approximately 40,000 workers and 30,000 former soldiers of 
the disbanded Iraqi army in the cities of Ramadi, Fallujah, Habbaniyah, Hit, 
Hadithah, Al Qaim, and Ar Rutbah.  Additionally, 3rd ACR hired 400 workers for 
the Ramadi Department of Sanitation.60 
Units in Ramadi initiated many projects to rebuild the infrastructure and 
restore basic services.  The United Nations World Food Program facility, 
operating out of Ramadi, was initially secured by elements of 3rd ACR.  This 
facility received and distributed over 1,400 truckloads of food to the local citizens.  
The Task Force also distributed over 49,000 Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) 
to various hospitals, clinics, and other facilities.  In addition, units renovated 
hospitals and clinics.  The task force provided medical care, supplies, and 
equipment.61  Although significant effort was made in Ramadi, limited personnel 
and resources prevented dynamic change in the city. 
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  Insurgent propaganda flourished in 
Ramadi.  The insurgents’ use of propaganda appeared to be more effective than 
Coalition Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).  
Early in 2003, propaganda appeared to be distributed primarily through rumor 
and graffiti.  Later, the insurgents began using multi-media means such as CDs 
and DVDs to spread their message.  From this information, some units were able 
to determine which groups were operating in the city.  Locals rarely came forward 
to report propaganda circulating in their neighborhoods.  In one instance, 
                                            
59 Blood and Steel!  The History, Customs, and Traditions of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, 39.  
60 Blood and Steel!  The History, Customs, and Traditions of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, 40. 
61 Blood and Steel!  The History, Customs, and Traditions of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, 41.   
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insurgents circulated propaganda stating that U.S. forces were kidnapping and 
raping Arab women in the neighborhood.  The units inadvertently perpetuated the 
false rumor by conducting raids in that area in the middle of the night.  Months 
later, the unit discovered the propaganda had been circulating, but no message 
was crafted to counteract it.62  This example of propaganda used by the 
insurgency demonstrates how counterinsurgency forces can lose the 
population’s trust.  The counterinsurgent must, therefore, use information 
effectively to counter insurgent propaganda.  In doing so, the counterinsurgent 
must be truthful. 
Some units worked harder than others to counteract insurgent 
propaganda.  They used radio and television, posters, meetings with local 
leaders, interaction with locals while on patrol, and leaflets.  Units that routinely 
and aggressively engaged the population reported fewer incidents of violence by 
insurgents over time and were able to gain more information about insurgent 
activity. 
c. Direct Action 
Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  According to those interviewed, an estimated 40-50% of individuals 
detained during this period were released. There were generally two categories 
of detainees who were released: those who were innocent, and those who were 
still suspected of being guilty, but for whom forces could not find sufficient 
evidence warranting further detention.  Mistakenly detaining innocent individuals 
may cause resentment and push them toward the insurgency.  Releasing 
suspected insurgents risks repopulating the network. This practice indicates 
difficulty in the ability to accurately identify insurgent cells and their operations.  A 
high percentage of catch and release tactics used by the counterinsurgent 
indicates an ineffective intelligence network.   
U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  In 2003, there were relatively few 
U.S. forces killed in action (KIA).   The number of U.S. casualties may shed light 
on a unit’s effectiveness in gaining the support of the population, showing the 
                                            
62 Special Forces officer, email message to authors, August 23, 2006. 
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population’s active or passive support for the insurgency.  Information during this 
period concerning attacks conducted by the insurgency was largely compiled at 
the provincial level. 
 
2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
Ramadi 0 0 0 1(RPG) 1(IED) 1(IED) 
2(SAF) 
0 1(IED) 1(IED) 
1(VBIED) 
Table 5: Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces in Ramadi in 200363 
 
3. Samarra 
 During the first days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Samarra saw few 
occupation troops.  The 4th Infantry Division focused on Tikrit, Kirkuk, and 
Balad.64  In May of 2003, Coalition Forces deemed Samarra in [the] Salah ad Din 
Governorate to be a permissive area.65  Just a few months after the liberation, 
the people of Samarra had “thoughts of the good life with a promising future.”66  
By the end of May, a brigade from the 4th Infantry Division assigned a Task 
Force (TF) the responsibility of securing Samarra and the surrounding farmlands.  
The assigned TF’s area of operation focused on Samarra and the areas along 
the Tigris River Valley and east to the main highway that connected the capital of 
Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul.  According to Colonel Frederick 
Rudesheim, the former commander of 3rd BCT, 4th ID, “The first five and a half 
months of our fight, we were moving all over [and] it was only in the latter half of 
                                            
63 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/Details.aspx. 
64 Page, 104-135, 239.  The first Coalition Forces to reach Samarra was Task Force Tripoli. 
1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 5th Regimental Combat Team [5 RCT (-)] attacked to clear 
Samarra on April 14, 2003.  On April 19, 2003 the 4th Infantry Division continued to clear 
Highway 1 to Tikrit, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, attacked north to link-up with the Marines in 
Samarra and TF 1-66 and TF 1-22 occupied a tactical assembly area (TAA) south of Samarra. 
The Division Relief In Place (RIP) with 3rd Infantry Division commenced the same day.  The 4th 
ID conducted combat and stability operations from Bayji to Samarra after their RIP.  By May 22, 
2003 their mission became to screen the borders of Iran and Iraq and a Brigade was tasked with 
a mission to secure/maintain presence in Samarra, Tikrit and Bayji.    
65 “USAID: Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Fact Sheet No. 26 (FY) 2003,” 
(May 5, 2003), http://reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SKAR-647JHZ?OpenDocument 
(accessed August 19, 2006).  
66 Afaf Samarraie, (Assistant Professor, Defense Language Institute), in discussion with the 
authors, October 27, 2006.  Ms. Samarraie is an Assistant Professor with the Field and Training 
Support Team, which is part of Continuing Education Department at the Defense Language 
Institute, Monterey, CA.  Afaf’s extended family originates from Samarra.    
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our year in Iraq that we had a fixed AO.”67  In the same interview he stated, “We 
did spend a lot of effort getting to know and understand those Iraqis in our AO. 
Samarra was important, but it wasn’t our focus.”68  
a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population. 
Security Forces.  Security forces in Samarra could be 
characterized as inadequate based on measurements in recent studies.69  A 20-
per-1000 security force to population ratio in Samarra yields a need for 4,000 
security personnel (2,690 using McGrath’s study).  The city of Samarra had 
200,000 citizens and the average coverage for 2003 by Coalition security forces 
was 400 Soldiers.  By the end of November and December, the number of 
security forces spiked and actually came close to recommended numbers.  
Elements from 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division supported operations there 
prior to being moved to Mosul.  They remained in Samarra for a total of six 
weeks and took part in Operation Ivey Blizzard.  The purpose of Operation Ivey 
Blizzard was to isolate and eliminate Former Regime Elements (FRE) and other 
anti-Coalition forces.70  An analysis of 2003 indicates an over-reliance on kill and 
capture tactics by Coalition Forces, which may have alienated the population.   
Information Gained from the Population.  Gaining support from 
the population is critical when conducting counterinsurgency operations.  
Fostering relationships and communication are essential to building trust.  
Samarra’s population of 200,000 citizens was made up of only nine tribes.  Of the 
nine tribes in Samarra, three of them made up 60 to 70 percent of the population.   
Building trust with these tribal leaders would garner exponentially increased 
                                            
67 Frederick Rudesheim.  Personal recorded interview, November 4, 2005. [Digital recording 
done by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 
KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS], 4. 
68 Rudesheim, November 4, 2005, 6.  Colonel Rudesheim’s brigade was responsible for 
Balad, the towns of Dujail, Duluiyah, and the city of Samarra, as well as, Highway 1 and Logistical 
Base Anaconda.  Samarra was just a small piece in the Brigade’s Area of Operation. 
69 McGrath, “Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations.”  
70 Michael E. Rounds, (Brigadier General, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, July 
26, 2006.  Brigadier General Rounds was the commander of 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division 
(Stryker) that was the first Stryker Brigade to be deployed to Iraq.  For a company commander’s 
perspective see “On the Day That Saddam Hussein Was Captured, Crazy Horse Troop Grew 
Up”, Army, March (2004). 
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returns on any investment of time and resources.   Initially, units had a difficult 
time building trust and working with the tribes of Samarra because they were 
moved around continuously.  According to Colonel Rudesheim, building trust with 
the population was difficult.   
Engaging the population in cities and towns was something that we 
did throughout, as we moved and occupied our AO.  It was both 
difficult and frustrating because we remained in AOs there for such a 
short while.  You’d start talking to folks, engaging, and then we’d pull 
out.  Sometimes other units would occupy in our place, but that kind 
of rapport with the Iraqis didn’t happen until we really ended up in our 
last BCT set. 71 
  
Eventually, Coalition Forces learned that if members of a certain tribe 
were involved in any anti-Coalition activity, the tribal leaders would know about it.  
By the middle of July 2003, the unit began offering $250 (USD) rewards for 
usable intelligence and $100 (USD) rewards for information leading to weapons 
caches.72   However, the unit found that paying for information was ineffectual 
and that tips freely given led to better results.   
    Civilian Casualties.  Civilians targeted and killed by insurgent 
groups during 2003 were limited.  Security forces did not track criminal activities, 
insurgent violence targeted at the population, threats, and intimidation. In 
November, a spike in casualties can be attributed to civilians caught in a cross 
fire between insurgents and Coalition Forces.  Uniformed insurgents attacked a 
Dinar exchange convoy delivering the new Iraqi Dinar to two of Samarra’s banks.  
The incident resulted in 54 enemy fatalities, but following this incident, there was 
speculation that the Coalition’s use of force had been indiscriminant.73  However, 
personal accounts from units involved in the incident sited no indiscriminant use 
of force.  Events like these are complicated and demand immediate Information 
                                            
 71 Rudesheim, November 4, 2005.   
72 Borzou Daragahi, “U.S. Kills Four in New Iraq Operation,” (July 17, 2003), http://a-1-
8.org/Docs/activeunit/index.php, (accessed on November 19, 2006).  
73 Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt and Daniel Senor at a Coalition Provisional Authority 
Briefing, December 1, 2003, Baghdad, Iraq at the CPA Headquarters. http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/transcripts/20031202_Dec-01_BG_Kimmitt_Briefing.html (accessed on October 17 
2006). 
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Operations (IO) actions to trace back the issues and grievances of the population 
to the root causes – the criminals or insurgents.    
2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
Civilian 
Casualties 
0 674 0 1 0 0 0 9 3 
Table 6: Civilian Casualties in Samarra in 2003 75 
Civilian casualty rates for 2003 were much lower when compared to other 
equally sized Iraqi cities.76   
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
Lack of trust in governmental institutions was a direct result of the inability of the 
governments - local, provincial, and national - to provide for the citizens of 
Samarra.  Samarra has struggled in recent years to develop a functioning local 
government and to become self-supporting of its infrastructure needs.  The 
Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in Kuwait gave an assessment of 
Samarra in May of 2003.  Their assessment found that unfiltered water was 
being pumped through the city of Samarra and residents cleaned the water by 
using commercial filters attached to their home faucets. Electricity was 
intermittent and operating at approximately 75 percent of pre-conflict capacity. 
Three health care facilities were operating in Samarra, one of which was the 
public hospital.  Medical re-supply was an issue with one of the three facilities, as 
it had less than a month’s supply of antibiotics and vaccines remaining.77 
                                            
74 On May 26, 2003 four wedding celebrants were killed while firing weapons into the air – a 
common practice in Iraq.  While this was a small incident it has been a topic of major 
conversations with the elders of Samarra for all units since; for the foreseeable near future it will 
be embedded in the Samarra psyche.  
75 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
76 Hamit Dardagan, John Slobada, Kay Williams, and Peter Bagnall, Iraqi Body Count: A 
Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005, July, (2005), http://reports.iraqbodycount.org/a_dossier 
_ of_civilian_casualties_2003-2005.pdf (accessed on August 12, 2006). 
77 “USAID: Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Fact Sheet No. 32 (FY) 2003,” 
(May 13, 2003), http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/updates/may03/iraq_fs32_051303.pdf (accessed on 
August 19, 2006). 
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 As of late 2003, more than 70 percent of the young men (between ages 18 
and 35) in the city were unemployed.78  The estimated per capita income in 2000 
was $500 (USD) to $700 (USD).  With over a decade of economic sanctions and 
two major wars, plus a lack of tourist and industry output, Samarra’s economic 
outlook looked bleak.  The population of Samarra looked to the fledgling 
government to remedy their situation.  The government, at all levels, had 
numerous obstacles to overcome in order for the population to trust them to 
provide for their needs and expectations.  Analysis of Samarra at the end of 2003 
shows that there may have been an enormous opportunity and pay off if trust 
could have been built between the Iraqi population and security forces. 
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  Insurgents’ use of propaganda, 
misinformation, and threats was prevalent in Samarra.  Since the beginning of 
the war, Coalition Forces found it difficult to convince the local population that 
insurgent propaganda was something that the people of Samarra should not 
worry about.  In July 2003, the Police in Samarra refused to investigate those 
responsible for a mortar attack that killed a civilian and wounded twenty-four 
others because they feared holdouts from the former regime would see them as 
traitors and exact vengeance.79 
Difficulties in dealing with insurgent propaganda in Samarra may have 
stemmed from the level of influence that each of the tribes had over the 
population.  The internal power structures that existed in Samarra allowed tribal 
leaders to influence their tribal members and the amount of information that was 
given to Coalition Forces.  The internal power structures stem from having only a 
few tribes controlling the political space.  Some of the tribes were exploited by 
the insurgents.80  Initially, Coalition Forces were unable to tap into the power 
                                            
78 “Samarra,” Global Security.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/samarra. 
htm (accessed on August 19, 2006). 
79 D’Arcy Doran, “Saddam Still Casts Long Shadow Despite Sons' Deaths,” (July 28, 2003), 
http://a-1-.org/Docs/activeunit/index.php (accessed on August 19, 2006). 
80 Special Forces officer, e-mail message to authors, August 23, 2006. 
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structure in Samarra.  Units felt that tribalism was not significant, however,  
learned that tribalism comprised the building blocks of Samarra society.   
c. Direct Action 
 Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  A number of successful raids were conducted using intelligence 
provided by Special Forces personnel living in the city.  The Special Forces 
Operational Detachment – Alpha (ODA) team in Samarra was able to gather this 
intelligence due to the team’s close proximity to the population. The nature and 
style of Coalition operations in Samarra during 2005 were mounted, mass 
formations with numerous armored fighting vehicles and dismounted infantry 
clearing forward.  Many classify this as a kinetic approach.  Operating in this 
fashion may result in alienating the population.  This approach could make it 
more difficult to build trust and consequently more difficult to gain intelligence.  
 
2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
AIF Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk 5481 Unk 
Table 7:  Anti-Iraqi Forces killed in Samarra in 2003. 
 
 U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  By the end of the 2003, 
units reported having daily enemy contact.  Insurgents in Samarra used RPG and 
small arms fire to ambush Coalition Forces.  On occasion, insurgents openly 
attacked Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Abrams Tanks with RPGs.  The largest 
insurgent attack occurred during the attempted robbery of the Dinar exchange 
convoy on November 30, 2003.  Besides this one event, most insurgent attacks 
in Samarra in 2003 were hit and run.  Insurgents may have used these tactics to 





                                            
81 Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt and Daniel Senor at a Coalition Provisional Authority 
Briefing, December 1, 2003, Baghdad, Iraq at the CPA Headquarters.  http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/transcripts/20031202_Dec-01_BG_Kimmitt_Briefing.html.  CPA briefing stated that this 
incident resulted in 54 enemy fatalities, with 22 wounded and 1 detainee. 
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2003 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
Coalition 0 3 0 0 0 0 1(IED/RPG) 
2 (MTR) 
2 (IED) 3 (IED) 
Table 8: Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces in Samarra in 200382 
  
4. Conclusion 
Due to the prevailing view in the Department of Defense that a smaller 
number of technologically enabled soldiers would revolutionize military affairs, 
the number of Soldiers and Marines employed in Mosul, Ramadi and Samarra 
during 2003 was below historically utilized levels for post-conflict stability 
operations.  Unfortunately, the unique nature of protecting and controlling the 
local populations reduced the importance of the coalition’s significant 
technological advantages.  The Ba’ath party’s inherent local knowledge and 
experience circumventing UN sanctions helped it survive an imperfectly executed 
foreign occupation.  The fact that the occupation was executed with numbers 
significantly below requirements needed to fully establish control at the 
neighborhood level only helped the Ba’ath party members endure the initially 
disorienting coalition surge into the country.  In addition, the fact that Ba’ath party 
fugitives were members of the organization which enforced a police-state 
security regime prior to the invasion suggests that if the fugitives survived the first 
months of the occupation and were not provided an acceptable alternative for the 
future, they were well prepared to clandestinely intimidate, recruit and organize.  
In general, the Coalition was psychologically, culturally and linguistically 
unprepared to enforce security at the local level.  This was compounded by the 
fact that it had to do so with a dearth of personnel, which only provided the 
former regime and anti-occupation Iraqis more room to maneuver and more room 
for error during its most vulnerable time.   
                                            
82 Eleven Coalition Soldiers died in Samarra in 2003.  Four were killed in Samarra and five 
near Samarra in the vicinity of Highway one, and three of the total perished in a helicopter crash 
in the Tigris River on May 9, 2003. 
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In Ramadi and Samarra, a U.S. forces mindset focused on kinetic combat 
operations, augmented by an economy-of-force mission profile, resulted in an 
emphasis on killing insurgents at the expense of establishing strong ties with the 
population.  Furthermore, the frequent rotation of units in and out of these two 
cities made establishment of local ties with the population, and thus control 
difficult to accomplish.   The emphasis on kinetic operations and the frequent 
rotation of units in and out of Ramadi and Samarra demonstrates a 
misunderstanding of the problem presented by insurgents and non-state actors, 
and an under-resourcing of assets needed to establish control.   
In Mosul, a better attempt to build strong ties with the population was 
demonstrated by the single unit that operated there from late April through 
December 2003. It focused on the population by working to establish a safe and 
secure environment.  While the numbers used to establish control were not at 
historic levels, effective population-focused efforts yielded relative stability.  Yet, 
by the end of 2003, even Mosul was suffering from an increase in insurgent 
growth and violence.   
Units that used precise direct fire and did not use indirect fires appeared to 
have caused less collateral damage and were therefore better able to gain the 
trust of the local populace.  Additionally, direct action synchronized with the 
appropriate IO message prevented the insurgency from developing negative 
propaganda directed at counterinsurgency forces.  
The analysis of each city suggests that above and beyond the importance 
of protecting the population and building local institutions, several elements were 
missing to completely control the governed populace.  These elements include 
linguistic skill employed at the neighborhood level, mature intelligence collectors 
with cultural expertise, an appropriate number of security forces to immediately 
establish complete control, and a broadly disseminated understanding that 
protection and control of the population requires a combination of consensus and 
coercion.    
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Understanding that consensus and coercion were required to protect and 
control the population would have provided leaders with the tools required at the 
local level to use coercion effectively when consensus was not yet universal.  
The use of coercion simply means that at the local level, cooperation with the 
government provides citizens with the benefits that the government provides.  
Failure to cooperate may lead to the withdrawal of these benefits.  The use of 
this concept within the rule of law and human rights is fundamental to 
establishing control at the local level.  Yet without linguistic skill, culturally savvy 
intelligence personnel, and an adequate number of troops, the only alternative 
was to have local security forces protect and control the population.  This solution 
was the chosen course with respect to local police forces, yet it too was difficult.  
While plans may have existed calling for the comprehensive and completely 
resourced training of locally employed Iraqi security forces, units tasked with 
performing this mission were neither culturally nor linguistically prepared to do 
so.   As a result, the training was sub-optimal.83  
Units in Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra were more successful at gaining 
information from the population when they maintained continuous presence at 
the neighborhood level.  Continuous contact was achieved through dismounted 
patrols at the squad and platoon level operating out of bases located in 
neighborhoods throughout the city.  These patrols gained information by making 
contacts with locals and building their trust.  Units that commuted to their sectors 
from FOBs outside of the city had less contact with the local populace and 
consequently were less sensitive to the situation at the neighborhood level.  
These units were also less likely to have strong ties with the local indigenous 




                                            
83 This is exemplified by units calling for NCOs with drill sergeant experience soon after the 
collapse of the regime to organize and establish training programs for local Iraqi security force 
units.  Importantly, the Army and Marine Corps units called to execute this in 2003 and 2004 did 




For the people of Mosul, 2004 was a year that began with great promise, 
yet ended with uncertainty.  The year brought a significant reduction in the 
number of U. S. forces serving there and reduced progress toward better security 
and economic growth.  Due to the approximate one-third reduction of U.S. forces 
in Mosul, the U.S. Army units who courageously served in Mosul did so as an 
economy of force mission. 
a.  Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
Security Forces. Until the end of 2004, when the collapse of the 
Mosul police caused a substantial increase in the number of security forces, the 
number of international security personnel working in Mosul during 2004 was 
approximately 2-per-1000 civilians.84  This low number hindered the Coalition 
effort to help Iraqis secure the population, train indigenous security forces, and 
rebuild infrastructure.  The reduction in force reflects a judgment that local 
security forces would be able to defeat internal threats without robust Coalition 
intervention.   
  The decision to reduce the number of Coalition Forces in Mosul was 
made based on the belief that Iraqi security forces would be able to shoulder a 
larger portion of the burden.  Unfortunately, the efforts to build up the ISF failed 
to produce lasting results. This was largely due to a dearth of skilled and 
dedicated trainers and advisors to follow up on the initial training program 
established by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) for the police and Iraqi 
Civil Defense Corps (ICDC).85  Due to a lack of combat advisors available within 
the two battalions remaining in Mosul, units were able to partner and advise local 
security forces only to a limited extent.  While two Special Forces ODAs were 
located in the city, their ability to influence local security forces was limited after 
                                            
84 “Arrowhead Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, 2004 Unit History,” (unit history 
for 3-2 IN (Stryker), 2004), Appendix A. 
85  The ICDC was originally organized as a local security force with a regional association.  
As the insurgency developed, the organization was reorganized into the Iraqi National Guard 
(ING) and further trained to conduct a more robust mission set.  In January 2005, the ING was 
incorporated into the Army.  
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they ended their training mission in order to focus on reconnaissance and direct 
action.86   
 Information Gained from the Population. Two unit transitions 
occurred in 2004, thus weakening interpersonal ties at the local level between 
U.S. forces and the Iraqi security forces.  The rotation of units created conditions 
that made efforts to reduce insurgent activity at the neighborhood level more 
difficult.  In spite of the strenuous efforts of U.S. Soldiers in the field, insurgent 
growth in Mosul continued during 2004.  By cutting the ties between U.S. forces 
and the Iraqi people and government twice, the Coalition effectively reduced its 
influence over the populace and increased the opportunity for insurgent groups to 
build their own ties to the population.  February 2004 marked the transition from 
the 2nd BCT and the 101st Airborne Division to the 3rd Brigade (Stryker), 2nd 
Infantry Division and Task Force Olympia.  The new unit in Mosul replaced four 
infantry battalions, a FA battalion, an MP battalion, a brigade headquarters and a 
division headquarters with 2 battalions, a brigade headquarters and a newly 
established Task Force Headquarters.  The smaller force in Mosul was unable to 
maintain a robust level of interaction with the population or local Iraqi Security 
Forces (most notably the police of Mosul).87   Without a dedicated force available 
to carry on progress made by the Military Police Battalion with the Iraqi police 
operating in the city, the local police forces ceased to improve as an 
organization.  Poor Iraqi leadership at the police headquarters and increases in 
insurgent groups operating in the city (arriving from the south and west) 
weakened the city police’s ability to protect the population and sustain itself when 
confronted with a fight.88 
                                            
86 Pat Roberson, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, August 10, 
2006.  
87 Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1, 3rd 
Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004), 34-
35. 
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February to September 2004 was a period during which the two battalion-
sized task forces in the city were not able to make further progress and could 
only try to maintain the status quo.89  While the size of force present was not 
ideal to make up for the smaller force size, units executed as many patrols as 
possible to reinforce Iraqi security forces.  In order to accomplish this, most of the 
patrols were mounted.  The new unit was unable to attain the level of local 
community knowledge previously maintained by platoons and companies 
operating out of patrol bases throughout the city.   Company commanders during 
this time noted the tremendous requirements placed upon them in their 
substantially sized area of operations.  Not only were they responsible for the 
tactical employment of their company, they were also dealing with neighborhood 
leaders, intelligence collection, infrastructure requirements, Iraqi security force 
coordination, and adjacent unit liaison.90   
The two battalions operating in Mosul were based primarily out of 
operating bases on the north and south side of the city.  The one exception was 
an infantry company and battalion headquarters that operated out of an FOB in 
the middle of town on the east side of the Tigris River.91  The decision to move 
from city-wide small unit outposts to the larger operating bases outside the city is 
widely debated.  On one side, the debate argues that the presence of foreign 
forces within the population is an engine for insurgent recruitment, and that the 
                                            
88 The former Mosul and Provincial police chief, Major General Barhowi, is a controversial 
figure.  While his early efforts to provide security to Mosul and the province were commendable, 
his ability to operate and effectively counter insurgent encroachment into the city were limited 
during the lessened U.S. force presence in Mosul in 2004.  Following the walkout by Sunni city 
council members following the assassination of the Governor/Mayor of Mosul in July 2005, 
insurgent activity continued against both U.S. forces and city police.  General Barhowi’s tribal ties 
to major insurgent leaders offer reason to doubt his ability to effectively target those leaders as an 
independent government security force leader.   Following the police collapse in November 2004, 
MG Barhowi was replaced.    
89 Michael Rounds, (Brigadier General, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, July 26, 
2006.  
90 A cross-functional team is a possible solution to this problem.  As already used by some 
units in the Army, the CFT is a small HQ element with command authority lead by a Major that 
has functional experts in areas such as intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, 
information operations and communications.  When employed, the CFT can enhance a battalion’s 
ability to employ functional experts at the neighborhood level in order to better influence the 
population.   
91 A.J Newtson, (Major, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, October 23, 2006.  
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urban military footprint should be reduced as soon as possible. The other side 
asserts that in order to properly ensure the nascent government survives in the 
face of an ongoing insurgency; neighborhood-level support to local security 
forces is required until they are able to survive on their own.  The experience of 
Coalition Forces in Mosul in 2004 demonstrated the need to ensure that local 
security forces had close support from either their own military force (preferred) 
or from the Coalition.  This will often mean that the supporting force is located in 
large population centers.  
The replacement of the battalion operating in western Mosul with a cavalry 
squadron (-) in July 2004 did not strengthen ties with the population.  The loss of 
personal rapport in the community set conditions for future instability.  Mosul 
became more unstable when an influx of insurgent fighters from elsewhere in 
Iraq began to challenge local security forces.  By the end of July 2004, the 
number of companies operating in Mosul was six.92  When compared to the 
twenty-two companies during the time of 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 
the smaller sized force represented a belief that the city was operating well on its 
own and required little coalition security assistance.  The final transition of 2004 
occurred between 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division and 1st Brigade, 25th 
Infantry Division.  The new brigade was also a Stryker organization and it 
inherited 3-2 SBCT’s organizational and theater property in total.  In addition, it 
inherited the same areas of operation occupied by the previous unit.  By the end 
of 2004, the population of the western half of Mosul had experienced three 
transfers of authority and a total of four different U.S. units.93 
                                            
92 Estimated number are based on unit task organization at the time and from interviews with 
officers who operated in the city.  The six companies operating in the city included 3 infantry 
companies, 1 cavalry troop, a military police company and an assortment of special operations 
forces operating in the city that the author has collectively counted as a company. 
93 1-502 IN, 2-502 IN and 1-320 FA operated in Western Mosul in January 2004; 1-5 IN 
operated in western Mosul from Feb – May 2004, 1-14 CAV operated in Mosul from Jun – Sep 
2004; 1-24 IN operated in western Mosul from October to December 2004 (1-24 IN remained in 
western Mosul throughout its deployment which ended in September 2005).  In addition to these 
transitions, SOF units continued to operate on 3-7 months rotations.  In all cases, the benefits in 
unit alertness and morale due to shorter unit tours do not mitigate the loss in interpersonal 
relationships and local knowledge that are essential to counterinsurgency. 
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 Civilian Casualties. According to the Iraqi Body Count Database 
and 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) significant activities collected for 
2004, the number of civilian casualties increased to higher levels beginning in 
March 2004.  The increase in civilian casualties remained at higher levels for the 
rest of the year with the exception of June and November.  The drop during these 
two months coincides with a significant increase in the number attacks focused 
against city police stations. This likely indicates that insurgent groups first 
focused on establishing control over the population before directly focusing on 
the cities security institutions.  In addition, the drop during these two months may 
also indicate an inability of insurgent groups to target both the population and 
security forces simultaneously.  This observation demonstrates insurgent groups 
using a strategy one and strategy two approach to establish control of the 
population.  Based on their ability to gather information (Approach one) and 
separate the population from the local government (Approach two), insurgent 
groups attacked the local government directly (Approach three).94   
 
2004 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV  DEC 
Civilian 
Casualties 
1 6 23 23 21 595 16 22 33 20 296 6 
Table 9: Civilian Casualties in Mosul in 2004 97 
 
 As the city’s security forces were increasingly under attack, the civilian 
population within the city became more vulnerable.  Several examples highlight 
the insurgent’s assault on the civilian population in order to influence it to stop 
                                            
94 See Diamond Model on pages 9 and 10 for description of approaches one, two and three.   
95 The few civilian casualties identified by Iraqi Body Count in June were the result of 
collateral damage associated with attacks against city police stations.  City security force 
casualties identified by Iraqi Body Count during this month numbered 62. 
96 The few civilian casualties identified by Iraqi Body Count in November were a result of 
collateral damage associated with the coordinated uprising against city governance and security 
facilities.  The number of ISF casualties identified by Iraqi Body Count during this month 
numbered 68. 
97 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
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supporting the local government and Coalition.  Rockets directed at the city hall 
killed four people in March.  Red Crescent officials were killed by gunfire in April.  
The brother of the man who provided information leading to the capture of Uday 
and Qusay was killed by gunfire in June.  The governor of Nineveh was killed 
while driving from Mosul to Baghdad in July.  A car bomb killed two people in a 
catholic church in August.  The deputy director of the northern oil company and 
his driver were assassinated while on the way to work in September.  Kidnapping 
also occurred during this time to spread fear and raise revenue.   
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
With fewer forces, Coalition interaction with the Iraqi police continued at the 
headquarters level, but resulted in a loss of personal interaction with 
neighborhood leaders.98  Furthermore, the reduced interaction between Coalition 
Forces and police weakened the city’s first line of defense against insurgent 
action.  By June 2004, teams of military and police advisors were not established 
and operating in Mosul.  Without a dedicated battalion to interact with police 
forces, the development of the IPS slowed.  Since the IPS during the Ba’ath 
Party era was not the force that maintained security or protected the population 
within Iraqi cities, the organization was learning an entirely new skill set.99  The 
lack of forces available to continue this task in 2004 limited the IPS contribution 
to maintaining a secure environment in Mosul.   
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  The transition from the 101st Airborne 
Division to Task Force Olympia generated great anxiety on the part of the local 
people of Mosul.  Instead of maintaining strong ties to the population and cutting 
the ties between the insurgents and the population, the Coalition damaged its 
relationship with the population by replacing a known and appreciated 
                                            
98 Pat Roberson, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the author, August 10, 
2006.      
99 Jerry Stevenson, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, September 
12, 2006.  LTC Stevenson was the Commander of 503rd MP Battalion in Mosul.  According to 
LTC Stevenson, “the concept of being proactive was foreign to them (Iraqi police) – under 
Saddam they had been a purely reactive force and had little, if no responsibility for public safety – 
that was the mission of the secret security and intelligence organizations.”  
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organization. Furthermore, the transition provided insurgent groups with an 
opportunity to capitalize on the people’s anxiety by working to cut the ties 
between the people and the coalition in Mosul.  In the process of cutting the 
weak ties between Task Force Olympia and the people of Mosul, insurgent 
groups were able to strengthen their ties to the population.  This occurred 
through neighborhood level propaganda and coercive action against local 
government leaders.    
 Sources of External Resources.  The process by which the 
existing insurgent and terrorist groups increased their ties to the local population 
repeated with the transition from 3-2 SBCT to 1-25 SBCT in October 2004. The 
displacement of insurgent members from central Iraq in the fall of 2004 further 
aided local insurgent groups.  With this displacement came additional people, 
weapons and financial resources.  While initially located in and around Tal Afar, 
the newly arrived terrorists soon began assisting and influencing the city of Mosul 
once they had gained a foothold in Tal Afar.100  In effect, the newly arrived 
terrorists were able to develop and grow their auxiliary.  Without a robust effort to 
train and advise local security forces at the local level, the local police force was 
largely on its own against insurgent elements that knew where the police’s 
families lived.  Furthermore, insurgent groups began to increase their influence 
over the local population.  This manifested itself in acts of intimidation and 
murder oriented toward those with ties to the Coalition or government.  Examples 
from unit reporting include attacks and messages aimed at changing behavior 
directed against the city’s television station manager, local interpreters and local 
contractors working with the Coalition.101 
c. Direct Action 
Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  The use of raids and searches continued throughout the spring and 
summer of 2004.  The number of these raids dropped throughout the year due to 
a lack of sufficient tips from the population.  By October 2004, the number of tips 
                                            
100 H.R. McMaster, (Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, July 25, 2006.   
101 “Arrowhead Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, 2004 Unit History,”  
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coming from the population into the city’s JCC was down to approximately 40 per 
month.102 The ability to precisely target insurgent leaders and cells depends on 
relationships developed with the population.  HUMINT can only be acquired 
when informers are confident in those whom they provide the information to, and 
in their own anonymity.   
A company commander who served in 2004 observed that he was so 
busy with conducting night missions, he was unable to devote as much attention 
as he wanted to the numerous other civil affair and leader engagement tasks he 
was also expected to accomplish. 103  In order to accomplish his mission, he and 
others relied on fire support officers to perform additional intelligence and 
information operations tasks.  This helped the company commander deal with 
task overload, yet failed to solve the cognitive overload encountered by unit 
leaders working at the local level.  In this company commander’s sector, he had 
thirty-one neighborhood Muktars.104  In addition to his combat duties, he was 
responsible for meeting with these leaders on a weekly basis.  Keeping names 
and relationships between members of the community straight is necessary in 
order to properly influence neighborhood leaders.  This task is likely impossible 
when an officer is responsible for such a large number of neighborhoods.      
The initial drop in the number of AIF captured in 2004 is a reflection of a 
new unit in Mosul getting to know the area after the 101st Airborne Division 
departed at the end of January.  Since fewer AIF captured remained a trend after 
January 2004, this may indicate less intelligence collection and analysis 
capability available in the smaller force operating in Mosul.   
 
                                            
102 Bingham Mann, e-mail message to authors, June 20, 2006. 
103 A.J. Newtson, (Major, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, October, 23, 2006.  
104 Newtson, October, 23, 2006.   
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2004 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
AIF KIA Unk 3 6 27 4 Unk 2 10 14 Unk105 Unk Unk  
AIF 
Captured 
225 82 108 92 51 Unk 53 40 79 Unk Unk Unk 
Table 10: AIF Killed and Captured in Mosul in 2004106 
 
Detaining fewer insurgent members does not necessarily demonstrate a 
lessoned ability to establish control and protect the population.  If fewer 
insurgents are being captured while attacks are also decreasing, then the trend 
may show that insurgent groups are in decline.  However, if attacks are 
increasing while detentions are decreasing, it may show that insurgent groups 
are growing in size and increasing their influence of the population.  Since 
insurgent attacks increased during 2004, culminating in the November uprising 
against the city’s police force, it is apparent that insurgent organization and 
influence increased during the year.  Importantly, capturing insurgent members is 
not the only way to influence the population, yet the ability to do so in an accurate 








                                            
105 Sims, 42, Data collected from this source showed the number of AIF KIAs and captured 
during the entire period from 10 October to 29 December.  AIF KIAs during this period numbered 
112, while AIF captured during this time numbered 141.   
106 “Arrowhead Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, 2004 Unit History,” 24-687.  
Data was compiled from the unit’s significant activities list taken from daily reporting and included 
in the unit history. 
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U. S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.   
2004 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
AIF 
ATKs 
62 79 100 131 119 Unk 102 133 158 105 261 194 
U.S. 
KIA 
4 0 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 3 4 
U.S. 
WIA 
Unk 1 12 65 47 Unk 20 24 44 Unk107 Unk Unk 
ISF 
KIA 
8 6 7 18 6 62108 10 16 19 Unk Unk Unk 
ISF 
WIA 
Unk 14 34 19 7 Unk 32 40 50 Unk Unk Unk 
Table 11: Attacks and Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces in Mosul in 
2004109 
 Analysis of Coalition and Iraqi security force casualties indicates that the 
majority of Coalition casualties occur due to indirect fire or IEDs, while Iraqi 
security forces were mostly wounded or killed by direct fire.  The differences in 
the types of casualties suffered suggests the insurgents used IEDs and indirect 
fire against U.S. forces due to better armor protection during patrols and an 
inability to otherwise target U.S. forces where they were based.  The ISF, on the 
other hand, were more vulnerable to direct fire due to their closer proximity to the 




                                            
107 Sims, 42.  The data cited from this source was grouped together from 10 October to 29 
December 2004.  U.S. WIAs from 1-25 SBCT during this period numbered 133.  ISF KIAs during 
this period numbered 146. ISF WIAs during this period numbered 142.   
108 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
The database showed that for month of June 2004, 61 police deaths resulted from several 
coordinated insurgent attacks against city police stations.  The 3-2 SBCT significant activities 
report data was used for all other months during this year. 
109 “Arrowhead Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, 2004 Unit History,” 24-687. 
Data was compiled from the unit’s significant activities list taken from daily reporting and included 
in the unit history (significant activities for the months of June were not included in the version of 




The 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division (1st BCT, 1st ID) 
remained in Ramadi until September 2004.  The mission of the brigade was to 
ensure the security, stability, and the reconstruction of Ramadi, and to defeat all 
terrorist and anti-Iraqi activity in Anbar province.  The unit was manned and task 
organized with a combination of Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), M1A1 Abrams 
tanks, trucks, and infantry; however, it lacked a sufficient number of translators.  
It established and trained an Iraqi Army Brigade (ING). 1 BCT also assisted with 
recruiting new Iraqi soldiers and resourced the brigade with equipment. 
In March 2004, the 1st Marine Division deployed to Anbar Province, 
replacing the 82nd Airborne Division. Army units in Iraq typically deployed for 
twelve months, while Marine units deployed for seven months.  In Ramadi, one 
Marine battalion augmented an Army brigade. During the first half of 2004, 1st 
BCT's two battalions (1-16th Infantry, 1-34th Armor) were augmented by the 2nd 
Battalion, 4th Marines. When 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines redeployed in August 
2004, they were relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines.  In April 2004, with 
most of the 1st Marine Division's resources focused on Fallujah, one infantry 
battalion, 1-16 Infantry was left to control the entire city.  In July 2004, 2nd 
Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division replaced 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. 
a.  Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
 Security Forces.   The estimated population of Ramadi in 2004 
was approximately 390,000.  According to security force ratio guidelines, a 
population of this size would need a security force of 7,800 police and troops. 
(5170 using the McGrath study)  A heavy brigade augmented with a Marine 
battalion and all enablers, including indigenous security and police, was well 
below 7,800 police and troops.  In April 2004, one infantry battalion was left in 
Ramadi, leaving approximately 1000 troops. 
Units made extraordinary efforts to train ISF (police and military) to 
alleviate the security situation in the city with varying degrees of success.  Units 
reported that when accompanied by U.S. forces, ISF could accomplish small 
scale operations at the platoon and company level; however, they could not 
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operate independently.  At times, ISF check points were left unmanned.  ISF 
leadership was frequently threatened by AIF personnel, causing some to resign 
or desert.  One company reported an AWOL rate of over 70%.   In some cases, 
insurgents who were detained were later discovered through interrogation to be 
ING or police personnel.   Although there were ISF operating in Ramadi, their 
initial effectiveness was not sufficient to contribute to the security effort in the city.  
Insurgents penetrated some ISF units. As a result, Coalition Forces did 
not give them too great of a responsibility and did not give them information a 
long period of time in advance of an operation.  Units attempted to vet the 
leadership over time; however, there were no databases available to determine 
whether somebody was part of the insurgency.  Lack of information about an 
individual was not confirmation that he was or was not an insurgent.  The only 
way ISF leaders could prove themselves to units was through the performance of 
their duties.110 
 Information Gained from the Population.  All units were able to 
gather intelligence from the population to a limited degree.  The quality of 
information varied over time and with location.  Most information was gained 
through mounted and dismounted patrols, route clearances, reconstruction 
projects, and meetings with local leaders.  Each company developed its own 
system of informants within its sector.  The information was often weak, but 
occasionally an informant’s information was actionable.  Information garnered 
from the population typically resulted in raids that were designed to capture or kill 
insurgents, or to seize caches.  Finding caches and individuals from information 
obtained from the population can raise confidence and verify the quality of the 
sources providing the information.  
Units had better results seizing caches than they did capturing insurgents.  
Any operation that removed the insurgency’s access to weapons, ammunition 
and explosives was beneficial.  However, without knowing the total number of 
caches that existed, numbers alone did not indicate success.  Most information 
                                            
110 Thomas Neemeyer. Personal recorded interview. 2 December 2005. [Digital recording 
done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS]. 
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received from informants was time sensitive, making it more difficult to capture 
personnel who were attempting to stay one step ahead of their pursuers.   
 Civilian Casualties.  The number of reported civilian casualties 
rose significantly in 2004.  According to the Iraq Body Count Database, there 
were approximately 65 civilian deaths in Ramadi from January 2004 through 
December 2004.  This may be attributable to the rise in criminal activity and the 
acts of coercion and intimidation waged by the insurgency.  A large number of 
casualties in June 2004 may indicate the insurgency’s attempt to influence the 
transfer of authority from the CPA to Iraqi interim government. 
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Table 12: Civilian Casualties in Ramadi in 2004111 
 
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  The insurgency used several different 
mediums through which to distribute their message in Ramadi.  They used 
posters, graffiti, CDs, DVDs, and cassette tapes.  Typically, unit intelligence 
sections (S2) tracked these messages to determine the insurgency’s desired 
effect.  PYSOP units produced anti-insurgent messages to counter insurgent 
propaganda.  Some units used radio and television to spread their message.  
Units that were able to effectively synchronize these messages with operations 
had more success at countering insurgent propaganda.  Countering insurgent 
propaganda was difficult if units used IO and PSYOP in a reactive mode as 
opposed to a proactive mode.  If units attempted to counter insurgent 
propaganda reactively, it was often difficult to effectively convince the population 
that insurgent messages were false.  This was often the case because by the 
time units discovered the propaganda, they did not have the cultural savvy to 
craft effective messages.   
                                            
111 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
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 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
According to one company commander, “something critical was missing in our 
attempts to dry up the insurgent support base.”112  Previous missteps by other 
units, as well as their own, had already turned the population toward the 
insurgency by the time they arrived in sector.  A company commander who 
served in Ramadi believed that trust could be built more effectively when units 
interacted closely with the population: 
In my opinion, almost all intelligence comes from line units on the 
ground.  THT elements need to be integrated at that level, because 
the populace generally only begins to provide information once they 
develop a sense of  trust.  If THT teams never have constant 
contact with individuals, then how can we expect people to provide 
them information?113 
 
Units conducted assessments to determine the true needs of the 
population, such as clean water, electricity, and sewage treatment, but couldn’t 
always deliver in significant amounts. Units provided support within the scope of 
their resources.  One officer reported, “We would do what we could, rebuild a 
school, but then we’d go back and people would be like, ‘This is great that you 
rebuilt the school, but we still don’t have any clean water. We still don’t have this 
and that.’”114 Units attempted to do small scale reconstruction projects using 
CERP funds, but these funds were not always enough to convince the population 
that Coalition Forces were doing everything within their capabilities.  The 
perception that Coalition Forces were unable to provide adequate security and 




                                            
112 Daniel Gade, (Captain, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, May 17, 2006.  
113 Nick Ayers, (Captain, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, May 22, 2006.  Although 
THT are trained to develop HUMINT, Soldiers and Marines who interact with citizens at the 
neighborhood level on a daily basis can often gain the most accurate information. 
114 Thomas Neemeyer. Personal recorded interview. December 2, 2005. [Digital recording 
done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS]. 
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c. Direct Action 
 Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  Intelligence assessments made of the insurgency during this period 
may have indicated a misunderstanding of the enemy.  According to unit 
assessments, relative calm throughout the city was an indicator that the 
insurgency had been broken.  The necessity for larger brigade operations toward 
the end of the unit’s rotation may indicate a growth in the insurgency during late 
2003 and into early 2004.  As the insurgency grew, ACF were able to conduct 
larger, complex operations against Coalition Forces.  Clearly, the insurgent had 
not been defeated during this period; he was simply readjusting to the situation.  
Units must reinforce success in order to maintain the initiative and to dominate 
the political space.  Five brigade level operations were conducted from April 
through August of 2004.   As a result of these operations, 71 insurgents were 
detained and 43 were killed.  The necessity of large scale operations may 
indicate the growth of the insurgency. 
 U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  The significant rise in U.S. 
casualties in 2004 may be attributed to the insurgency’s growing sophistication 
and the counterinsurgency’s inability to control the population and gain 
intelligence. 
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Table 13: Attacks and Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces in Ramadi in 
2004116 
 
                                            
115 This number is the result of a single incident involving an ambush against Coalition 
Forces on April 6, 2004. 
116 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif/.  Wounded in Action 
statistics from September 2004 through December 2004 were unavailable. 
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By September of 2004, Ramadi rated fifth among Iraqi cities for having the most 
frequent U.S. military fatalities. 117 
 
3. Samarra 
On March 15, 2004, the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) (TF Danger) 
assumed responsibility from the 4th Infantry Division for Multinational Division – 
North Central, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.118  An infantry battalion 
task force was assigned Samarra as its Area of Responsibility (AOR).  The 
Infantry task force had an armor company and a company of infantry from the 
New York National Guard to complete its organization.  The commander’s intent 
for all operations was to use enemy oriented operations to defeat anti-coalition 
forces, build credibility in transitioning for Iraqi self-governance, and ensure a 
secure and stable environment for all forces.  The commander stressed that all 
operations should be conducted while treating all Iraqi people with dignity and 
respect.119   
a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population. 
Security Forces.  The number of Coalition Forces assigned 
responsibility for Samarra did not change form 2003 to 2004.  4,000 is the 
security force size number associated with the historical guideline, but the actual 
number averaged less than 1000.   Iraqi Security Forces were present in the city 
of Samarra, but were not much help to Coalition efforts to establish security.  Not 
until ISF forces partnered with advisors in the fall of 2004 were ISF forces able to 
conduct operations.120  The task force commander in Samarra stated that the 
                                            
117 The Brookings Institute, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in 
Post-Saddam Iraq,” Saban Center for Middle East Policy, September 20, 2004, 
www.brookings.edu/iraqindex. 
118 John Batiste and Paul Daniels, “The Fight for Samarra: Full-Spectrum Operations in 
Modern Warfare”, Military Review, May-June (2005), 14.   
119 Task Force 1-26 Infantry History: The Battle of Easter Sunday, 11-12 APRIL 2004, 
Samarra, Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM II, (battle summary, TF 1-26 IN, 2004).  This 15-
page battle summary was provided by the Operational Leadership Experiences (OLE) Project, 
Combat Studies Institute, 201 Sedgwick (Flint Hall) Rm. 15, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.  
Lieutenant Colonel Kirk Allen’s interview, taken on August 31, 2006 by CSI, was also used.  
Lieutenant Colonel Allen was the commander of Task Force 1-26 Infantry stationed in Samarra 
during 2004.   
120 James Lechner, (Colonel, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, August 13, 2006.  
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local 202nd Battalion of the Iraqi National Guard disintegrated in April as 
uprisings broke out in Fallujah, Samarra, and other Sunni Muslim areas. The 
battalion consisted of 750 soldiers, but under insurgent pressure, its membership 
decreased to 40 soldiers.  By October, Iraqi Security Forces operating in 
Samarra included the 201st, 202nd, 203rd, and 7th Iraqi Army Battalions as well 
as, the 36th Special Police Commando Battalion.121             
 Information Gained from the Population.  Establishing strong 
ties to the population was difficult for Coalition Forces because the population 
believed that the previous units had mistreated them.  Commanders were 
reminded of past infractions committed by coalition forces, specifically the 
wedding party shootings which occurred in 2003.  On May 24, 2003, the CPA 
filed a memorandum to the State Department that discussed a recent meeting in 
Samarra between Coalition Forces and one of the top Sheiks in Samarra.  Sheik 
Nahid Faraj told the Samarra city council that while no one wanted to admit it, the 
situation in Samarra was a direct result of excesses of forces over the part 
year.”122  A report filled from the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated in July 2004 that “at least 10 families a day 
are leaving Samarrah…because of rising tensions between U. S. forces and 
insurgents.”123  When this report was filed, Coalition Forces left the city at the 
request of the Samarra City Council.  The same OCHA report quoted Sheikh 
Ahmed Abdul Ghafoor al-Samarraye as saying, “[Samarra] residents are known 
for their loyalty to former President Saddam Hussein.”124  A statement from 1st 
Infantry Division explained that the reason why people were leaving Samarra 
                                            
121 John Batiste and Paul Daniels, “The Fight for Samarra: Full-Spectrum Operations in 
Modern Warfare,” Military Review, May-June (2005), 8. 
122 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York: The Penguin 
Press, (2006), 357.   
123 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq: Families leave 
as tension rises in Samarrah,” Integrated Regional Information Network, July 26, 2004, 
http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian//hsr/iraq/04b/ixl14.html (accessed on November 20, 2006).  
124 “Iraq: Families leave as tension rises in Samarrah,” http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian//hsr/ 
iraq /04b/ixl14.html.  
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was because the insurgents were using threats, intimidation, random attacks on 
the populace, and indiscriminate mortar fire on civilian homes.125 
Initially, the only U.S. forces operating from within the city belonged to a 
Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha (SF) (ODA) team with a security 
platoon provided by the task force.  Over the course of 2004, insurgents targeted 
their safe house numerous times.  Eventually the safe house was given back to 
the city of Samarra and was subsequently blown up by the insurgents.  It wasn’t 
until after Operation Baton Rouge126 in October 2004, when coalition forces 
regained control of Samarra, that daily continuous patrols focused on gathering 
intelligence were the norm.127  After Operation Baton Rouge, two permanent 
patrol bases were established in the city to help focus Coalition efforts.  After the 
retaking of Samarra, one of the company commanders stated: “It was our 
constant presence [in Samarra] that has been key to our success.”128     
 Civilian Casualties.  The total number of non-combatants killed in 
Samarra during 2004 was 160.129  Of the total number, 129 civilian casualties 
were reported by the Iraqi Body Count Database during the three month period of 
October, November and December.  Two events stand out during this period.  
During the night of October 1, 2004, 48 civilians were believed to have been 
                                            
125 “Iraq: Families leave as tension rises in Samarrah,” http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian//hsr/ 
iraq /04b/ixl14.html. 
126 Operation Baton Rouge was a major offensive operation focused on regaining control of Samarra 
on October 1, 2004. Total forces included approximately 5,000 soldiers comprised of 3,000 Americans and 
2,000 Iraqis troops.  Samarra had recently been under the control of insurgents and a no-go area for 
coalition forces. U.S officials estimated that there were anywhere from 500 to 1,000 insurgents entrenched 
in the city.   The major military offensive lasted three days and on October 4, 2004 coalition forces were able 
to claim victory. That same day the U.S military announced that the operation resulted in about 125 
insurgents killed and 88 were being detained. Iraqi security forces were placed in charge of the city to insure 
its future stability. Operations in Samarra then shifted to civil-military operations designed at repairing parts 
of the city's infrastructure and improving basic services.  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-
baton-rouge.htm. 
 127 Cory McCarty, personal recorded interview, May 24, 2006. Digital recording done by 
Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in 
possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS]. Pg. 1-20.  Command 
Sergeant Major Cory McCarty (CSM) was the division CSM for 1st Infantry Division during the 
division’s deployment from February 2004 to March 2005.   
128 Ben Marlin, (Major, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, June 27, 2006. Major Marlin 
was a company commander in Samarra and until recently an advisor for a battalion of Iraqi 
National Police.  
 129 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
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killed by enemy indirect fire.  On November 6, 2004, 30 civilians were reportedly 
killed when a series of car bombs and gunfire hit the town hall and police stations 
in Samarra.  Incidents involving a high number of civilian casualties isolate the 
population, forcing citizens to side with elements that can protect them.   
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Table 14: Civilian Casualties in Samarra in 2004132 
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
Trust in government institutions increased gradually over the course of 2004.  By 
January of 2005, there were 96 reconstruction projects underway, with $13.9 
million (USD) allocated to them. The Iraqi Interim Government provided an 
additional $25 million (USD) for projects in Samarra.  Of the 96 total projects, 51, 
worth $9 million (USD), were already in progress during 2004, and work was 
accelerated on two water renovation projects.133   A large increase in financial 
support during the last few months of 2004 helped to increase the populace’s 
trust and view of Samarra’s government institutions.  Since March of 2003, 
Samarra had not received enough financial support to warrant a positive belief 
that government would be able to provide for the citizens of Samarra.  With close 
to $40 million (USD) allocated towards rebuilding Samarra and one-quarter of 
those funds improving life, at the end of 2004 there was hope.  Trust may come 
with this hope. 
 
 
                                            
130 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
On the night of October 1, 2004 and the morning of October 2, 2004, Anti-Iraqi Forces used 
mortars that impacted in the city of Samarra; coalition forces used air strikes and counter-battery 
fire to target the enemy weapon systems.  Associated Press, Reuters, and two independent press 
reports on October 4, 2004 led IBC to determine that forty-eight civilians were killed.     
131 On October 6, 2004 car bombs and gunfire were reported. Of the 42 total fatalities for the 
month of October, thirty were attributed to this one event. 
132 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
 133 U.S. Department of State press release on November 12, 2004, http://www.state.gov/r 
/pa/prs/ps/2004/38162.htm (accessed November 5, 2006). 
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b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
  Insurgent Propaganda.  In Samarra, insurgent propaganda was 
used effectively.  The insurgents used primarily rumor and word of mouth to 
intimidate the population.  Insurgent propaganda was targeted specifically at Iraqi 
Security Forces and the population in general.  Iraqi Security Forces were not 
able to function because of fear and intimidation.  Most of the ISF units in 
Samarra managed to have more than twenty percent of its unit report for duty.  In 
September, police advisors were attached to the local police force and from this 
time forward, propaganda had less of an impact on the ISF.134   
According to an infantry commander serving in Samarra, his unit 
discovered few propaganda products, but believed insurgents were able to 
control segments of the population through fear and intimidation.  A report filed 
by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in July 
2004 stated that many families fled the city because of fear.  After Operation 
Baton Rouge in October of 2004, specific operations targeting the insurgent 
network reduced the effects of propaganda.135  Major General John R. S. Batiste 
stated that his units spread themes and messages focused on changing the 
attitudes and giving Iraqis alternatives to the insurgency.  They applied “spheres 
of influence” that focused resources and personnel at all levels – Division, 
Brigade, Battalion, Company, and Platoon – at certain groups of leaders and 
                                            
134 Christopher Dutton, (International Police Liaison Officer), e-mail message to authors, 
November 16, 2006.  Chris Dutton has been in Samarra since August 2004.  He was first 
assigned to the Thar Thar Police Station which was located in Al Qalah, a suburb of Samarra.  He 
stated that Samarra was ruled by AIF in August 2004 and believed nobody could go into the city.  
In October 2004 to January 2005 he worked as an advisor with to the first company of the first 
battalion of the first brigade of MOI Police Commandos.  After January 2005 he was assigned to 
a new MOI Public Order Battalion as they came to Samarra to help with the elections and was 
then embedded into a military SPTT team.  From June 2005 until recently he was assigned as the 
Team Leader for the International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) working for the Samarra Police 
Department.  For more information see the U.S. Department of State’s Fact Sheet – Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the Iraq Criminal Justice Program, 
May 18, 2005. http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/47759.htm 
135 James Lechner, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, August 13, 
2006.  Lieutenant Colonel Lechner was the Senior Advisor to the 7th Iraqi Army Battalion during 
September to November 2004 while in Samarra. He is currently the Deputy Commanding Officer 
for the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division that is serving in Ramadi, Iraq.   
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people from the Provisional to the neighborhood levels.136  Commanders at all 
levels met with government, tribal and religious power brokers and professionals 
who influenced the Iraqi people and understood the challenges in their areas of 
operation.137   
An examination of 2004 shows that for a period of eight months, 
propaganda was the weapon of choice for the insurgent.  However, once 
Coalition Forces partnered with Iraqi Security Forces returned to the city and 
focused their operations on providing security for the population, propaganda 
became less effective.     
  Sources of External Resources.  When the 1st Infantry Division 
arrived in Iraq, the Division believed that external support for groups working for 
anti-U.S. involvement and actions in Iraq would come in the form of external 
monetary support.  The Division believed that external support going to groups 
such as Religious Fundamentalist Cells, Foreign Fighters and Iranian Insurgents 
would be the Division’s most dangerous enemy course of action.138  External 
support to the insurgents was not the most pressing issue for Samarra during 
2004.  The insurgent network in Samarra had four months during 2004 to 
develop resources internally and from external sources.  After Coalition Forces 
left Samarra in July, there were no forces in the city focused on stopping the 
insurgents and identifying external support, until they returned in October.  
During the period of no security forces the insurgents had unlimited room to 
maneuver and plan for future operations.   
c. Direct Action. 
 Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
operations.  Unit operations in Samarra after the Transition of Authority on 
February 12, 2004 consisted of patrols originating from outside the city.  The unit 
had three companies that rotated between force protection of the Forward 
                                            
136 Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “Task Force Danger in OIF II: Preparing a Secure Environment 
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137 Hollis, 6. 
138 “1st Infantry Division’s Soldier’s Handbook to Iraq - 2004,” http://www.globalsecurity 
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Operating Base and patrols into Samarra.  Operations continued in this manner 
until June 1, 2004, when, based on agreements on Iraqi Sovereignty, units 
agreed to withdrawal at the request of the city council.  The unit conducted four 
missions into Samarra, but believed that Samarra grew into a safe haven for 
terrorists.139  Most of this was due to in the inability for local security forces to 
protect Samarra.  In September, Coalition Forces returned to Samarra and 
began to re-engage the population and conduct small unit missions.  After 
Operation Baton Rouge, which involved five U.S. battalions and six Iraqi 
Battalions, insurgent causalities increased to an average of 45 per month.140   
  U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  In 2004, insurgents in 
Samarra primarily used Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs), followed by small 
arms fire, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars. There was a tendency 
to use IEDs near the main highway east of Samarra, which heads north toward 
Mosul.  Small arms attacks generally occurred within the city.  During one attack, 
insurgents used four car bombs.  Insurgents also attacked police stations in the 
neighboring towns of Haditha and Haqlaniya on the same day. The trend 
illustrates the insurgents’ propensity to employ ‘hit and run’ tactics and roadside 
bombs because of lower risks, compared to coordinated attacks.   
Twenty-three soldiers lost their life in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
in Samarra during 2004.  A very low percentage of attacks against Coalition units 
resulted in casualties, with most attacks being poorly coordinated and 
executed.141  In April 2004, attacks against Coalition forces in Samarra increased 
from five to fifteen per week.142  On April 11, 2004, insurgents conducted a 
complex attack against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces.  During the next 
                                            
139 Interview with an Army Officer, July 15, 2006.  
140 Batiste and Daniels, 21. 
141 William A. Adler, (Major, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, June, 9, 2006.  Major 
Adler served in Samarra as an Advisor to the 7th Battalion, 3rd Brigade, of the Iraqi Army.  His 
mission, initially, was to conduct leader and soldier training with the Iraqi Battalion and then 
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142 Batiste and Daniels, 2. 
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couple of months, insurgents attacked with RPGs, small arms, and IEDs.143  
Both Coalition and Iraqi units responded to insurgent attacks immediately.  The 
units’ response was to cordon off the area and begin questioning of locals in the 
area to determine who was responsible for the incident.  The Samarra police 
force was often the main focus of insurgent attacks.  On several occasions in 
November 2004, concurrent with Operation Al Fajr in Fallujah, a number of 
insurgents returned to the city to target the police force, killing fifteen police 
personnel in one raid.144   
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Table 15: Attacks and Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security 
Forces in Samarra in 2004145 
 
4. Conclusion 
Despite extraordinary efforts in 2004, units operating in the cities of Mosul, 
Ramadi, and Samarra had difficulty maintaining close ties with the local 
population.  Frequent unit transitions in the cities prevented Coalition Forces from 
gaining intimate knowledge of the population. In addition, a reduction in security 
forces prevented the Coalition from achieving a high density of interaction with 
the local populace.  With fewer troops available, units were forced to economize 
available forces and conduct more mounted presence patrols than dismounted 
patrols.  This approach degraded units’ ability to maintain control and support of 
the population and therefore, lessened their ability to gain intelligence.    
Units conducted assessments to determine the true needs of the 
population, such as clean water, electricity, and sewage treatment, but couldn’t                                             
143 Ben Marlin, (Major, U.S. Army), e-mail to authors, June 27, 2006.  Major Marlin was a 
company commander that served in Samarra and is now on a SPTT team working with a 
Battalion of Iraqi National Police in Baghdad, Iraq.  
144 Batiste and Daniels, 7.   
145 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif/. 
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always deliver in sufficient amounts.  Units provided support within the scope of 
their resources. Units attempted to do small scale reconstruction projects using 
their CERP funds, but these efforts were not enough to satisfy the expectations 
of the population, and therefore Coalition Forces had difficulty gaining their trust.  
In many cases, insurgents successfully used sabotage and propaganda to 
discredit reconstruction and security efforts.  These tactics made it easier for the 
insurgency to foment discontent amongst the population. 
In order to increase security within the cities, units trained and equipped 
indigenous security forces.  Large portions of these forces were ineffective.  
Those ISF units that could operate required close supervision and could only 
perform small-scale operations.  Many ISF units had become infiltrated and had 
to be disbanded or relieved.  In the fall, some ISF units were replaced with 
Special Police or Iraqi Army units - national-level assets that were not as 
susceptible to infiltration and intimidation.  These units were effective at dealing 
with local threats in the short term, but not in the long term.  As a national asset, 
these units were frequently redeployed to other regions across the country, as 
they were needed.  Therefore, they did not effectively solve the problem of 
inadequate security forces at the neighborhood level. 
Coalition Forces in two of the three cities increased their execution of 
large-scale operations to counter insurgent forces.  These operations consisted 
of large numbers of military and police forces in an attempt to overwhelm 
subversive elements in the cities.  These operations were successful in capturing 
caches and a large number of suspected insurgents, but did little to defeat the 
insurgency. By September 2004, Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra were classified as 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth cities respectively, in which U.S. forces sustained the 
highest number of fatalities.146  Despite extraordinary efforts by the 
counterinsurgency, insurgent attacks grew in their scope and sophistication.  The 
rise in insurgent attacks suggests insufficient forces to deal with the problem.  
Furthermore, due to the reduction of forces in Mosul and Samarra and the 
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frequent transition of forces in Mosul and Ramadi, units were unable to maintain 




Mosul began 2005 as a city under siege by insurgent groups.  This was 
largely because the city’s security forces were not able to handle insurgent 
threats when supported by a Coalition force one-third the size of the previous 
unit.  After the collapse of the police in November 2004, the coalition and the 
Iraqi government surged security forces into the city.  The possibility that the city 
would fail to hold elections in January 2005 was a strong motivator to raise the 
Coalition’s priority of support to Mosul.  After an intense six month urban 
counterinsurgency campaign conducted by a reinforced brigade of U.S. Army 
soldiers, Iraqi soldiers and Iraqi Special Police Commandos, Mosul ended the 
year as a city once again in the process of rebuilding itself.   
a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population.  
 Security Forces.   In 2005, Mosul witnessed a change from an 
economy of force mission to a national priority, requiring additional assets in 
order to establish security and accomplish elections in January and December.  
As a city under siege, the surge of security forces in the city focused largely on 
the conduct of offensive small unit operations.  Aided by effective intelligence 
operations gained by the population, the units operating in Mosul in 2005 were 
able to accurately target the most violent insurgent groups operating in northern 
Iraq.  With a more robust force presence, the coalition was increasingly able to 
convince the local populace that it, along with national Iraqi security forces, were 
the strongest force in Mosul and worthy of increased support.  The number of 
security forces increased greatly prior to the end of January 2005 elections.  In 
early November 2004, there were six U.S. military companies operating in Mosul.   
By January 2005, there were approximately twenty companies of U.S. military 
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and fifteen companies of Iraqi security forces.147  The total external security force 
during the January elections timeframe represents a ratio of approximately 5-per-
1000 of the population.148 This ratio was still well below previously established 
norms for post-conflict security environments, and was likely the reason Coalition 
Forces were unable to more quickly regain dominate the battle space. 
 Information Gained from the Population.  The period from 
January to May 2005 marked the ongoing battle between hardened Salafist 
insurgent groups and Coalition Forces.  With an increased intelligence collection 
and analysis capability, U.S. Army units operating in Mosul would have been 
more capable of dismantling the insurgent organization.  In the absence of 
additional intelligence personnel attached to units operating at the neighborhood 
level, battalions augmented their own intelligence sections with Soldiers who 
were not previously trained as intelligence specialists.149  The infantry battalion 
intelligence structure had not changed in over seventeen years.  The reliance on 
higher level intelligence kept the battalion intelligence section without any real 
analysis capability.  The environment faced by the infantry battalions in Mosul 
required significant changes that commanders were forced to develop from 
within. 
The greater density of forces in Mosul allowed for greater collection of 
information from the population.  The reorganization of battalion intelligence 
sections allowed for this information to be analyzed at a level with intimate 
knowledge of the battle space.  According to Lieutenant Colonel Erik Kurilla, the 
battalion intelligence section requires an operations section, a planning section                                             
147 U.S. companies serving in Mosul in January included 9 infantry companies from 1st 
Brigade (SBCT), 25th Infantry Division, 4 airborne infantry companies, 3 light infantry companies, 
2 mechanized infantry companies, an armor company and special operations forces of 
approximately company size. The national Iraqi force effectively operating in Mosul during this 
time consisted of 1 Iraqi Army Brigade and 1 Special Police Commando Brigade. 
148 “External Security force” includes U.S. forces and Iraqi Army and National Police 
elements.  This number does not include the remaining police force, the majority of which 
deserted in mid-November 2004.  Many Iraqi police were on duty during the January elections, 
but the organization was still being rebuilt.  During this time a common U.S. Army tactic was to 
employ platoons from neighborhood police stations.  This is a useful approach to gain local 
control of an urban area, but was also necessary for the rebuilding of local Iraqi police forces. 
149 Erik Kurilla, “Intelligence Reorganization in COIN,” (Power Point briefing outlining 
Battalion S2 reorganization, 2005). 
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and a detainee operations section.150  The additional sections provide analytical 
capability and target exploitation.  These two sections were sorely missing 
previously.     
 Civilian Casualties.  The increase in U.S. and Iraqi security forces 
in Mosul in 2005 helped the local government and Coalition Forces gradually 
regain local control.  This resulted in a gradual decrease in civilian casualties.  As 
the Coalition and Iraqi security forces achieved greater situational awareness 
within the city, they were more efficient at protecting the population from 
insurgent violence.  By the summer of 2005, civilian casualties had decreased 
due to the effective disrupting of the most dangerous insurgent organization 
operating in and around Mosul.  Interestingly, the ability of insurgent groups to 
continue to conduct a high number of attacks while also targeting civilians in the 
city, likely indicates an increase in organization and capability from the previous 
year.     
2005 JAN FEB MAR151 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV  DEC 
Civilian 
Casualties 
10 14 70 11 29 10 10 20 11 Unk Unk Unk 
Table 16: Civilian Casualties in Mosul in 2005152 
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
The increase in the number of security forces and their presence in Mosul 
neighborhoods improved the local perception of government and coalition 
control.  The population responded to this by significantly increasing the number 
of tips called into the city’s Joint Coordination Center (JCC).  From a November 
2004 low of 40 tips per month, the number increased to 400 tips per month by 
                                            
150 Erik Kurilla, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, November 12, 
2006. 
151 Shi’a funeral car bombed on March 10, 2005 that resulted in 50 civilian deaths. 
152 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
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June 2005.153 This shows an increase in awareness and willingness to transmit 
information to the city’s security institutions.     
Coalition forces operating on the city streets created situations that often 
angered or injured Iraqi citizens.  One of the larger groups of people who had to 
constantly deal with coalition convoys and patrols were the city’s taxi drivers.  
This group in Mosul had organized themselves into a political organization.  By 
meeting with and listening to the problems this organization had to deal with on a 
daily basis, Coalition Forces in Mosul helped influence the population in a 
positive way.  By understanding the importance of political organizations, like the 
taxi driver association, Coalition forces in Mosul were able to build stronger ties 
to the population and to redress grievances of an organization that dealt with 
Coalition Force vehicle traffic most often.154   
From January through June, 1-25 SBCT spent $20.1 Million (USD) on 
infrastructure improvements. Nineteen police stations and twenty-four military 
outposts were funded to improve the local Iraqi security force capability.155  This 
effort helped to reinforce the local security force and was a short term 
improvement that contributed to perceptions of control.  Previous construction 
efforts in 2003 and 2004 demonstrated that once complete, constant vigilance 
was required to ensure the security infrastructure was well maintained and 
properly protected.  
b. Disruption of Opponents Control over the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  Insurgents used propaganda extensively 
during the early months of 2005.  Following the collapse of Mosul’s police force, 
insurgents’ intimidation of the population continued to manifest itself in the form 
of graffiti, flyers, and digital media.  As observed by a battalion operations officer 
serving in Mosul in 2005, insurgent propaganda was effective in the early months 
of 2005, and became less effective as combined operations of U.S. and Iraqi 
                                            
153 D.A. Sims, “A Year in Northern Iraq: One Perspective on Irregular Warfare 1st Brigade, 
25th Infantry Division, (Stryker Brigade Combat Team)” (Power Point briefing, Joint Urban 
Warrior, Small Wars Conference, Potomac, MD, 2006), 52. 
154 Omar Jones, (Major, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, August 3, 2006. 
155 Sims, 57. 
72 
security forces succeeded in dismantling several terrorist cells operating in the 
city.156  These operations succeeded because Coalition Forces were able to 
acquire accurate intelligence from the neighborhoods.  Coalition Forces worked 
closely with ISF to gain intelligence from the population.  Coalition Forces, in 
partnership with the local government, began an IO campaign to discredit the 
insurgents operating in Mosul.  An Iraqi initiative that helped to counter insurgent 
propaganda, “Mosul’s Most Wanted”, became a popular local television program.  
This television program deglamorized insurgent activity and featured former 
insurgents who discussed their guilt and shame for their participation in activities 
against the people.157  
 Sources of External Resources.  Combined Iraqi and U.S. 
operations in Tal Afar were an important component of Mosul’s improved security 
environment.  By controlling Tal Afar, a major source of external support and 
sanctuary was denied to insurgent and terror cells operating in and near Mosul.  
Insurgent groups were no longer able to operate their own schools and training 
centers in Tal Afar.158  An additional measure used to disrupt external resources 
from entering Mosul was the construction of an earthen berm surrounding the 
city.  Initially manned by Coalition Forces, the checkpoints into the city were later 
taken over by Iraqi security forces.159  Coalition Forces serving in Mosul made 
varying assessments of the berm’s effectiveness. Many agreed, however, that 
when checkpoints and the perimeter were actively and aggressively surveilled, 
insurgents were less capable of infiltrating resources into the city. 
c. Direct Action 
 Insurgent Casualties/Detentions resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  The Coalition’s use of small unit combat patrols and surveillance of 
suspected enemy locations characterized operations in 2005.  A greater density 
of forces allowed for deeper penetration into the neighborhoods by the Coalition.  
                                            
156 Jones, August 3, 2006.  
157 Bingham Mann, (Captain, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, June 20, 2006. 
158 H.R. McMaster, (Colonel, U. S. Army), in discussion with the authors, July 25, 2006.  
159 “1st Brigade (SBCT), 25th Infantry Division, 2005 Unit History,” (unit history for 1st SBCT, 
25th ID, Fort Lewis Washington, November 10, 2005), Appendix G-1. 
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From an initial force posture of six companies in November 2004, to an election 
force posture that included twenty companies plus a Police Commando Brigade 
(approximately 1000 commandos) and an Iraqi Army brigade, the force 
assembled in Mosul was able to take the initiative in a way that had not been 
accomplished since the 2nd BCT (+) of the 101st Airborne Division departed in 
February 2004.  Coalition units in Mosul dealt with both insurgent activity and 
political challenges that required action. According to an infantry battalion 
commander, “We executed ‘continuous targeting’ with detailed weekly target 
meetings to review target sets across a range of lines of operation.  In many 
ways we applied elements of the operational art to the tactical fight.  This 
demonstrated the on going ‘blurring’ of the tactical to operational levels of war at 
echelons previously considered purely tactical ones.”160   
An increase in combat between Coalition Forces and insurgents during 
this period can be attributed to the struggle for control at the neighborhood level.  
When Coalition Forces in 2004 were unable to dominate the city through a high 
density of patrols through the neighborhoods and the city’s police forces were not 
able to make up the difference, the insurgency was able to fill the void left 
behind.  In early 2005, Coalition Forces had to regain lost ground occupied by 
the insurgency.  The result was a day to day street fight between insurgent cells 
and soldiers operating in small units of mainly squads and platoons.161  Nighttime 
targeted raids and daytime combat patrols allowed U.S. battalion commanders to 
regain control of the streets of Mosul at the neighborhood level.  According to a 
company commander who operated in western Mosul in early 2005, squad and 
                                            
160 Todd McCaffrey, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, August 
10, 2006.  
161 During this time the Mosul city police were still being reconstituted and did not initially 
play a prominent role. 
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platoon urban surveillance and patrolling were the key to eliminating drive by 
shootings and overt insurgent intimidation in his area of operation.162   
Table 17 depicts the number of enemy and suspected enemy killed or 
captured by Coalition operations. The re-energizing of joint-interagency 
cooperation improved intelligence collection and exploitation of emerging targets.  
The result was more effective Coalition targeting in the neighborhoods of 
Mosul.163  The number of suspected insurgents captured between February 2004 
and September 2004 averaged approximately 75 per month.  By February 2005 
through September 2005, forces captured approximately 386 suspected 
insurgents per month.  Data showing the number of detained insurgents that 
were released was unavailable.  If the release rate was high, this may indicate 
units’ inability to target effectively.  High detain and release rates risk damaging 
relationships with the local population.  If the release rate was low, this may 
indicate that units were able to collect better intelligence, allowing them to target 
insurgents precisely.  The collection of evidence by counterinsurgent forces could 
also be a factor in release rates.  Suspected insurgents are often tried in the Iraqi 
Judicial system and must be proven guilty through sufficient evidence.   
 
2005 JAN 1 FEB -
20 MAR 
 21 MAR - 
31 MAY 
1 JUN – 
15 SEP 
AIF KIA 99 87 126 74 
AIF WIA 25 45 30 28 
AIF 
Captured 
455 851 977 1070 
Table 17: AIF Killed and Captured in Mosul in 2005164 
                                            
162 Ken Burgess, (Major, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, October 12, 2006.  The 
tactics used by this and other companies in Mosul during the early months of 2005 utilized 
squads in upper floors and rooftops to over-watch street patrols.  These small unit tactics were 
employed based on pattern analysis of insurgent actions.  Effective urban surveillance in addition 
to other combat patrolling and intelligence gathering methods helped to regain tactical 
neighborhood dominance.   
163 Sims, 20-29. 
164 Sims, 44-50. 
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 Coalition Casualties / Insurgent Attacks. Table 18 shows the 
amount of AIF activity and its effectiveness inflicting casualties on U.S. and Iraqi 
security forces.  Iraqi Security Forces received high casualty rates.  Despite 
these casualty rates, Iraqi Security forces had less desertion than 2004 and 
improved in their performance with the assistance of Military Transition Teams 
(MTTs).  National Iraqi security forces overcame their minimal impact in 2004, to 
make the largest Iraqi impact on security in Mosul in 2005.  The operations 
conducted by the 6th Iraqi Army brigade, 1st Division and the Police commando 
“Wolf” brigade were significant to regaining control of Mosul.  The example 
provided by these two units was a positive one for the regionally recruited 2nd 
Iraqi Army Division and Mosul police force to follow.  
 
2005 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY 1 JUN – 15 
SEP 
AIF ATKs 486 420 307 294 244 416(JUN-JUL) 
U.S. KIA 2 5 2 1 3 2 
U.S. WIA 102 Unk 103(Feb-Mar) Unk 161 (Apr-May)  125 
ISF KIA 38 Unk 24(Feb-Mar)  Unk 43 (Apr- May) 83 
ISF WIA 39 Unk 57(Feb-Mar) Unk 164 (Apr-May) 131 
Table 18: Attacks and Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security 
Forces in Mosul in 2005165 
 
The 2nd IA Division performed poorly during the November 2004 uprising 
and was gradually reconstituted during 2005.  A U.S. Army Major serving as an 
advisor in Mosul in 2005 attributed its poor performance to inadequate leadership 
and a lack of advisors initially below the Division level.166  While they were less 
capable than the 6th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Infantry Division, and the Special Police 
Commando “Wolf” Brigade, the battalions of 2nd IA developed into better units as 
the year progressed.  
                                            
165 Sims, 44-50 and Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif/. 
166 Tommy Stoner, (Major, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, September 22, 2006.  
MAJ Stoner has Infantry and Special Forces combat experience.  He served in Mosul for a year 
as an operations advisor to the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division.    
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 A key challenge faced by advisors to Iraqi security force units was 
communicating to Coalition partner units that local security forces must take the 
lead on maintaining security.  Leaders of partner units must employ squads and 
platoons in missions with local security forces. This may entail higher risk in 
terms of force protection, and less control over all elements conducting the 
combined combat patrol.  Overcoming cultural barriers required constant work.  
MTT members praised the warrior spirit of Coalition Forces in Mosul, yet also 
wished units would do more to take the extra risk required to partner and operate 
with Iraqi security forces at the local level.   
  
2. Ramadi 
Marine and Army units in Ramadi continued to rotate on overlapping 
schedules. The 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (2-2 ID) arrived in July 2004, 
while the 1st Marine Division was still in charge of Anbar Province. 1st Marine 
Division was replaced by 2nd Marine Division in February 2005.  Working first 
with the Marines from 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and later with their 
replacements, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and then the 3rd Battalion 7th Marines, 
the 2-2 ID's three battalions (the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 503rd 
Infantry; and 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry) conducted counterinsurgency 
operations until July 2005, when they were relieved by the 2nd Brigade, 28th 
Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard. 
a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
 Security Forces.   In May of 2005, there were approximately 3,400 
ISF working in Ramadi.  This force, in addition to the U.S. Brigade, totaled 
approximately 8,400.  The force ratio in Ramadi exceeded recommended ratios 
and was the highest that it had been since March of 2003; however, due to ISF 
training and leave schedules, approximately one-third of ISF were available for 
operations at any given time.  Many ISF units, while guided by partner units, 
could perform basic missions, but could not operate independently. Local 
indigenous forces must eventually comprise the majority of security forces at the 
local level, but until they fully mature, they must be given the chance to train and 
gain experience.  A security vacuum cannot exist while this process takes place.  
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Coalition force strength in the city did not change.  Units trained indigenous 
forces while simultaneously trying to maintain security.  This may have provided 
an extreme burden on Coalition Forces.   
 Information Gained from the Population.  Units attempted to 
gain information and support from the population during meetings with local 
leadership.  They often discussed ECP operations, detainee status, and the 
execution of focused raids versus large scale cordon and search operations.  
While these topics are important, it appears as if negotiations made with local 
leaders focused on how to ease up on security measures and less on what local 
leaders could do to stem violence.167 
 Civilian Casualties.  There were 67 Iraqis killed through July 2005.  
This number of civilian casualties showed an increase by 43 deaths during the 
same period in 2004.  This number is high, considering the rise in the number of 
security forces in the city.  This may be attributed to the insurgency’s attempt to 
intimidate the population from supporting security while ISF were still in the 
developmental stages.  It also served to discredit the fledgling ISF units.  If these 
units could be perceived by the population as a failure, the insurgency could gain 
tighter control over the population. 
2005 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL 
Ramadi 20 5 4 0 13 14 9 
Table 19: Civilian Casualties in Ramadi in 2005168 
 
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.   
Dependable electricity continued to be an issue throughout 2005. Coalition 
Forces used the installation of new transformers in neighborhoods to reward 
those that cooperated with counterinsurgent efforts.  Additionally, Coalition 
Forces delivered $500,000 worth of medical supplies to the Women’s and 
Children’s Hospital, built new bridges, and cleaned parts of the city by employing 
                                            
167 Johnny Cook, (Major, U.S. Army, Retired), in discussion with the authors, October 21, 
2006. 
168 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php. 
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citizens.  These efforts helped in the short term to develop trust, but were not 
large enough in scale to impact large segments of the population.   
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control of the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  Flyers and Mosque broadcasts had a 
significant impact on the population, seemingly paralyzing the populace in their 
homes.  In one example, a unit detained the wife of a suspected insurgent.  This 
sparked calls from local citizens to protest female detention.  An SOF unit 
operating in the city did not communicate with local Coalition Forces with regard 
to the detention of a female.  This caused confusion over the circumstances 
relating to the incident.  The local headquarters unintentionally responded to the 
local population with false information.  This miscommunication risked damaging 
the Coalition’s reputation and made it difficult gain the local population’s trust.  
The insurgency was able to use this incident as a basis for increased 
propaganda in the city.  Regardless of accuracy, announcements of successful 
operations increased the strength of warnings to stay home or evacuate for 
pending attacks.   
c. Direct Action 
 Insurgent Casualties / Detentions Resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  In order to gain intelligence, some units periodically rounded up 
individuals and brought them back to the detention facility to get whatever 
information they could out of them. Some of them had to be released because 
they couldn’t necessarily prove they had done anything wrong.  These catch and 
release operations risked turning innocent or neutral civilians against the 
counterinsurgent. 169 
 U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  By May 2005, small arms 
attacks averaged three per day; IED attacks averaged six per day; and indirect 
fire attacks averaged one per day city-wide. SAF attacks increased significantly. 
Insurgents mainly focused their attacks on targets of opportunity, such as static 
observation posts (OPs) and entry control points (ECPs). There was also a large 
                                            
169 James Raymer, Interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project team with 
Combat Studies Institute, digital recording, February 24, 2006. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  
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concentration of IEDs near the Government Center.   Attacks on ECPs and ISF 
soldiers appeared to be the target of choice for high profile attacks.  These 
attacks appeared to be aimed at intimidating ISF and reducing their legitimacy. 
 





















Table 20: Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces in Ramadi in 2005170 
 
3. Samarra  
In 2005, Coalition Forces made their third attempt in three years to hand 
over control to the local government and its security forces.  When the new task 
force assumed control over Samarra, there were zero local police.171  Insurgents 
had overrun all the city’s police stations. Those officers who had survived had not 
returned to work.    
Two very important factors brought about a period of local stability and 
security. The first was the construction of a berm in August of 2005, which 
encircled the city. This berm was a security perimeter.  It was manned with 
observation posts and entry control points, reducing the amount of resources 
needed to wage an insurgency.  The second was the introduction of two 
battalions of Special Police Commandos from the MOI in Baghdad.  As a result 
of the increase in security forces, incidents decreased from twelve per day to an 
average of less than two.172 
 
 
                                            
170 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif/. 
171 Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Seeks to Escape Brutal Cycle In Iraqi City,” The Washington 
Post, December 26, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005 /12 
/25/AR2005122500798_pf.html (accessed on November 7, 2006).  
172 Tyson, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005 /12 
/25/AR2005122500798_pf.html. 
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a. Gaining Control and Support of the Population 
 Security Forces.   In February 2005, a Battalion task force from 
the 3rd Infantry Division assumed responsibility for Samarra. It remained in 
Samarra for eleven months until it completed a RIP/TOA with a battalion task 
force from the 101st Airborne Division.  In 2005, Coalition Forces maintained an 
average of three company teams in the city; two companies were at Patrol Base 
Uvanni and a company minus at Patrol Base Olsen.173  The unit maintained 
approximately two-thirds of their units actively conducting missions within the 
city.  Using the 20-per-1000 security force to population ratio, Samarra would 
need 4,000 security personnel (2,690 using McGrath’s study).  The average 
security force ratio for 2005, including Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, was 
approximately 7-per-1000.174  The security situation in 2005 was largely 
unchanged from 2004, except for when Special Police Commando units operated 
in Samarra. 
  Information Gained from the Population.  Company 
commanders who operated in Samarra during 2005 believed that information 
gathering in Samarra was hampered by tribal leaders who marginalized those 
who provided information to security forces.  Tribalism is rooted deeply in Iraqi 
society and adds a dimension to the insurgency that outsiders find difficult to 
understand.  Some tribes support the insurgency, while others back the 
government.  In many cases, tribes are divided in the loyalties.175  Fear of 
reprisals also impeded information gathering for security forces.  A platoon leader 
                                            
173 Ryan Wylie, (Captain, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, August 18, 2006.  
Captain Wylie was one of the Infantry Company Commanders that served in Samarra in 2005. 
174 Patrick Walsh, (Major, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, July 24, 2006.  Major 
Walsh was the operations officer for the Task Force that served in Samarra.  The most notable 
difference in Samarra in 2005 verses the previous two years is that large percentages of Coalition 
Forces lived in patrol bases in the city.  The highest force ratio for Samarra occurred during the 
month of April 2005.  Coalition Forces in Samarra in 2005 consisted of 9 Infantry Platoons, 2 
Engineer Platoons, 2 Armor Platoons, 1 Mortar Platoon, with 3 additional Armor Platoons 
operating outside the city.  In April 2005, the 3 Armor Platoons operating outside the city went 
back to their parent unit.  Iraqi Security Forces in Samarra in 2005 consisted of an Iraqi Army 
Battalion operating outside the city of Samarra and in the city, a Special Police Commando and a 
Public Order Battalion. 
175 Antonio Castaneda, “Iraqis Cooperate After Insurgents Slay Tribal Chief”, The 
Washington Times, December 5, 2005, http://www.washtimes.com/world/20051204-112759-
3808r.htm (accessed on November 7, 2006). 
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who served twelve months in Samarra in 2005 was often asked by the populace, 
“Why should we tell you anything when you cannot keep the insurgents in jail or 
execute them?”176  Despite these problems with gathering information from the 
population, units depended on information gained from tips to plan and conduct 
operations.   
 Civilian Casualties.  There were 86 civilian causalities in Samarra 
during 2005.177  The largest event occurred when insurgent indirect fire hit 
homes on two separate occasions in September, killing eleven people.  Roadside 
bombs, landmines, and car bombs accounted for 31 civilian deaths; mortars 
killed 26; and the remaining civilian casualties were caused by small arms fire.  
An Analysis of Samarra during 2005 shows that Samarra began the year with a 
high number of civilian casualties and violence, but with the addition of Iraqi 
Security Forces partnered with Coalition forces focused at providing security, the 
numbers of civilians killed drooped sharply.  The spike in violence during August, 
September, and October can be attributed to the insurgents’ failed attempt to 
regain control of Samarra. 
Samarra  JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV  DEC 
Civilians 
Casualties 
24 8 1 3 2 3 1 14 11 9 2 8 
Table 21: Civilian Casualties in Samarra in 2005178 
 
 Building the Population’s Trust in Government Institutions.  
From 2003 through 2005, the local government was tumultuous because of 
frequent personnel turnover.  In 2005, the local government and public 
administration in Samarra was comprised of a 36-member city council, a Mayor, 
                                            
176 Ron Hudak, (Captain, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, August 17, 2006.  CPT 
Hudak served as a platoon leader on Patrol Base Uvanni, Samarra, Iraq, from January 2005 to 
January 2006. 
 177 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php.     
178 The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/bodycount.php.     
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and a Deputy Mayor.179  The chairman of the city council, Sheik Taha Husayn al 
Abassi, was assassinated in August of 2005. The mayor, who was wounded by a 
car bomb in 2004, still had not returned to work, and the deputy who had taken 
over mayoral responsibilities went into hiding following the chairman’s 
assassination.  Samarra had numerous problems establishing a functioning local 
government and in the eyes of the people, they were ineffective.  Samarra’s 
difficulties in maintaining a functioning local government was one of the causes 
for its difficulties in providing services. 
  When assessed in 2005, basic services in Samarra were inadequate.  
Sewage in Samarra flowed into either private cesspools or ran untreated through 
ad hoc piping into the Tigris River.  The sewage treatment plant did not function.  
Most of the city had access to treated water, but water distribution was 
inadequate.  Trash pickup was non existent in the city.  The city’s landfill was at 
full capacity.  Outlying areas had no trash disposal system and had to burn their 
trash in wadis.  Electricity, academics, and medical sectors were problematic, but 
functioning.  The inability of the local government to provide basic services 
reduced its ability to gain the trust of the local populace. 
Samarra was fortunate to have a hydro-electrical power plant and be on 
the national electrical power grid.  This resulted in a city average of sixteen hours 
of electricity per day, which was uncommon in other cities.   Fuel (Benzene) was 
the only other assessed resource that was above average, with a wait time of 
less than 30 minutes in the nine city gas stations.  In Samarra, a total of twenty-
six CERP projects, valuing $2.2 million (USD), were underway in 2005.  Eleven 
were completed by mid-June, and another fourteen were in progress.180  
                                            
 179 Wylie, August 15, 2006.  The city council set policy and plans for future development.  
The city council was the primary link between local contractors and developmental monies.  A 
chief reason for a lack in local governmental successes was do due to corruption.  Most Coalition 
officers believed all council members and tribal leaders were corrupt and that contracting money 
directly fueled the insurgency.  The AIF in Samarra used intimidation and bribes to control who 
received reconstruction contracts.  If an Iraqi contractor, usually from Tikrit, received a contract, 
insurgents used violence against him.  Iraqi contractors felt that unless they paid off the AIF, they 
wouldn’t be able to work in Samarra.   
 180 “MNF-I Year in Review,” June 18, 2005, http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-
Year-in-Review_2005-Fact-Sheets.pdf (accessed on November 20, 2006). 
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Unemployment declined over the course of 2005, primarily due to the large 
amount of funds granted to Samarra from the national level. 
b. Disruption of Opponent’s Control over the Population 
 Insurgent Propaganda.  Insurgent propaganda sufficiently 
intimidated the population and hindered Coalition attempts to pacify 
neighborhoods and develop contacts.  The insurgents in Samarra used 
intimidation and violence to prevent the population from giving information to 
local security forces.  On several occasions insurgents blew up the homes of 
informants and murdered prominent tribal and government leaders.  They even 
murdered two doctors for working with security forces.181 Insurgents used fatwas 
as a means of propaganda.   One notable fatwa directed the local population to 
target the Iraqi Army and its advisors first and Coalition Forces second.182  Units 
noticed a considerable increase in actions targeted against Coalition advisors 
and Iraqi security forces from these fatwa.  Propaganda targeted the 7th Iraqi 
Battalion that was working outside of Samarra by accusing them of mistreating 
civilians. The propaganda specifically singled out Shiite soldiers, because the 
unit was known as a Shiite battalion working near a Sunni city.   An additional 
fatwa offered a bounty of $25,000 (USD) for the head of a U.S. advisor working 
with the Iraqi Army.183  The local Iraqi government countered these propaganda 
efforts by refuting the propaganda and conducting increased dismounted patrols.  
These efforts were an attempt to trace the root of the problems touted by 
insurgent propaganda back to the insurgents themselves.   
 Sources of External Resources.  Large weapons caches were 
not found by security forces in the city of Samarra in 2005.    Unlike the caches 
that were found post-Operation Baton Rogue, insurgents used transfer points to 
bring its bomb-making material into the city.  Forces found small caches of one or 
two artillery rounds during this period, but rarely anything more.  The insurgency 
                                            
181 Ryan Wiley, (Captain, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, August 18, 2006. 
182 Peter Mucciarone, (Major, U.S. Army), e-mail message to authors, July 28, 2006. Major 
Mucciarone served on a MiTT in Samarra and is a Civil Affairs officer in the United States Army 
Reserves.  The fatwa was found a month prior to the first election. 
183 Mucciarone, July 28, 2006. 
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in Samarra was more transient in nature.  It was no longer anchored to the city, 
but used the surrounding area and even the larger cities of Tikrit and Baghdad as 
a base of operations.  After large coalition operations or the threat of large 
operations, the enemy fighters would leave the city.  Most insurgents planned, 
prepared, and lived on tribal farms outside of the city.  This was the main 
justification for building the berm that encircled Samarra.   
c. Direct Action 
 Insurgent Casualties / detentions resulting from Coalition 
Operations.  Coalition forces forwarded thirty percent of enemy detainees to 
higher U.S. and Iraqi Detention Facilities. A company commander who served in 
Samarra in 2005 stated that, of the percentage of detainees that units released, 
fifty percent were of no value and twenty-five percent were of slight value. The 
remainder was believed to be guilty, but there was not enough evidence to justify 
further detention.  Capturing and then releasing large numbers of suspected 
insurgents may indicate difficulty in gathering accurate intelligence.  Detaining 
innocent civilians may damage relationships built with the population. 
Operation City Market was one of the first large-scale operations in 2005, 
which was largely led by MOI soldiers. The operation took place from March 3 to 
13 and used MOI Commandos and the Public Order Battalion.  The anti-
insurgent operation began March 4 in Samarra, with more than 1,500 Iraqi 
Security Forces personnel executing missions.  It was MOI’s largest anti-
insurgent operation, completely led and executed by Iraqi leaders and troops.184  
The hope of the operation was to crush the insurgency.  It failed in this respect, 
but it did show that the Iraqi security forces possess the ability to conduct 
operations on a large scale.  Their continued efforts, as with the Coalition efforts, 
should be to decentralize, operate at squad and platoon levels, and focus on 
providing security; these will be the true measure of success.   
 U.S. Casualties / Insurgent Attacks.  Insurgents used IEDs as 
their primary weapon in 2005.  IEDs were responsible for all Coalition fatalities in 
                                            
184 U.S. Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 16, 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63747.pdf (accessed August 21, 2006). 
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2005 except one.  Unlike 2003, when the enemy used a variety of attacks with 
success, a higher use of IEDs by the insurgents indicated their propensity to use 
stand off weapons against Coalition Forces.  To a lesser degree, other stand off 
weapons were used by the insurgent, such as mortars and rockets.  Most of the 
patrol bases in Samarra were regularly attacked with mortar fire in 2005.   
Coalition Forces did, however, receive complex attacks on their positions, 
but these were not the norm.   In one example, insurgents initiated their attack 
with indirect fire to distract security.  They then followed with a vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device (VBIED) to breach the outer walls and used small 
arms fire to suppress security bunkers located on roof tops.  The lack of success 
for the insurgent, in this instance, was due to a tip received by Coalition Forces to 
be prepared for such an attack.  
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0 0 0 0 
ISF 6 13 1 0 6 2 3 6 0 0 1 5 
Table 22: Attacks and Casualties incurred on Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security 
Forces in Samarra in 2005185 
 
4. Conclusion   
In Iraq, 2005 was seen as a year wrought with challenges and successes.  
Iraq completed three successful nationwide elections, voted for a transitional 
government, drafted the most progressive, democratic constitution in the Arab 
world, approved that constitution, and elected a new government. With each 
successive election there was a larger turnout and broader participation than the 
one before.186  However, during 2005, Iraqis saw one of the most violent periods 
since the beginning of the war, with numerous suicide bombers hitting targets 
across Iraq and the security situation worsening in certain areas.   
                                            
185 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif/. 
186 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Progress and the Work Ahead in Iraq”, January 10, 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060110.html (accessed November 10, 
2006). 
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Growth of the ISF in all three cities was seen by the authors as the most 
promising factor in overcoming security challenges. While less severe, ISF 
desertion and AWOL rates remained a problem.  The introduction of more 
military advisors serving with Iraqi battalions and companies, however, led to 
marked improvements in the quality and performance of many ISF units.  
The withdrawal of Coalition Forces away from the cities, whether for 
support to other operations around Iraq or based on assessments that the 
insurgency in a particular city was defeated, left a void that local indigenous 
forces were unable to fill.  Insurgents took the opportunity to fill this void.  As a 
result, the Coalition established greater presence to regain ground lost in the 
cities. The increase of security forces in the cities during 2005 helped fill 
shortcomings in the total numbers of forces required to provide security to the 
population.  An improved security helped build trust between security forces and 
the local population, resulting in more information provided by populace to 
security forces. 
Tips on insurgent activity received from the population increased during 
2005.  A significant factor enabling progress against the insurgency in Samarra 
and Mosul was the dramatic increase in intelligence tips received from the 
population, which may be indicative of increasing rejection of the insurgents.187  
An increase in the willingness of the population to provide information about 
insurgent operations was partially a result of security forces’ ability to protect the 
population and meet its expectations.  Trust was increased through honesty with 
the population and the restoration of basic services.  When units and the local 
government were able to live up to the expectations of the population, local 
citizens gave information about subversive elements operating to prevent 
progress and were generally more cooperative with Coalition efforts; when units 
were unable to meet the expectations of the population, regardless of how 
unreasonable their expectations may have seemed, units could not depend on 
                                            
187 Report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, October 2005. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d20051013iraq.pdf .  In March 2005, the number of tips 
received from the population was 483 and by August 2005 the number was 3,341. 
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their support.  Without support of the population, the ability to gain intelligence 
was extremely difficult. 
Various tactics were used to disrupt the insurgency’s ability to control the 
population. In Mosul and Samarra, berms were built around the perimeter of the 
cities.  This tactic may have hindered the insurgency’s ability to bring resources 
into the cities.  The extensive use of IO, such as television programs in Mosul, 
became very effective at discrediting the insurgency and became popular among 
citizens in the city. 
Coalition Forces detained a large number of suspected insurgents in 
2005.  Data was unavailable regarding the numbers of suspected insurgents that 
were released due to insufficient evidence.  If the release rate was high, this may 
indicate units’ inability to target effectively.  High detain and release rates risk 
damaging relationships with the local population.  If the release rate was low, this 
may indicate that units were able to collect better intelligence, allowing Coalition 
forces to target insurgents precisely.  The quality of evidence collected by 
counterinsurgent forces could also be a factor in high or low release rates.  
Suspected insurgents are often tried in the Iraqi judicial system and must be 
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III. ACHIEVING CONTROL  
A. APPROACHES THAT ACHIEVED CONTROL 
Units conducting operations that achieved control in a city or town were 
successful at building strong ties with the population.  These units were able to 
observe what was occurring at the neighborhood level and were able to influence 
what they saw.  The ability to do so is reflective of the units’ ability to influence 
the population’s perceptions and expectations.  Based on case studies of Mosul, 
Ramadi and Samarra from 2003 to 2005, the following approaches helped units 
establish control and protection of the population.   
1. Population Focus  
Due to the nature of insurgency, the counterinsurgency’s efforts to gain 
intelligence must focus on the population.  Because the insurgent initially lacks 
sufficient force to challenge the counterinsurgent directly, he must remain 
underground, hidden among the population.  Therefore, the insurgent maintains 
an informational advantage over the counterinsurgent.  The population holds the 
solution to this information dilemma.  By focusing on controlling the population 
through building ties, the counterinsurgency can gain the information it needs to 
defeat the insurgency.  Focusing on the needs of the population at the outset of 
any military operation will prevent any potential insurgency from having the 
political space to maneuver.  This approach to counterinsurgency may, in fact, 
serve as a preventive medicine of sorts. 
Active, aggressive patrols focused on interaction with the populace are the 
most effective means of controlling the population. Dismounted patrolling is more 
effective than mounted patrols, because dismounted patrols allow more 
interaction with the population at the neighborhood level.188  Not only do these 
patrols enable the counterinsurgent to gain information about the enemy, but 
they also help the counterinsurgent ascertain the needs of the locals.  This kind 
                                            
188 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level 
Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June (2006): 103-9.  Kilcullen’s Article #10 – Be There 
and his residential approach is in line with patrols focused on the population at the neighborhood 
level. 
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of information can lead to reconstruction projects that can build the population’s 
trust in government institutions.   
Although mounted patrolling provides less situational awareness than 
dismounted patrols, most units were forced to conduct mounted patrols due to 
the size of their sectors.  These units would have been unable to cover their 
entire sector without the use of mounted patrols.  When units maintained 
constant interaction, engagement and contact with the local populace, they were 
able to gain information more effectively.   
Although urban patrols must be prepared to use lethal force at all times, 
the patrol’s focus must be on interacting with the population in order to build 
strong ties.  The patrols must be deliberate, with a focus on gaining intelligence.  
Gathering specific information is the main purpose of these patrols.  Each patrol 
should be assigned specific information requirements that are nested with the 
patrol’s overall task and purpose.  Every patrol should contribute to influencing 
the population to support the government and not insurgent groups.   Patrols that 
simply perform movement to contact operations or presence patrols are less 
likely to gain useful information.  These operations tend to be more reactive in 
nature.  Also, these patrols should be enabled with all available resources, such 
as civil affairs teams, HUMINT teams, psychological operations teams and 
interpreters.  Information gained through patrols must be collected by the 
company and battalion headquarters so that it can be synthesized with existing 
intelligence.  Patrols may gather information that appears to be useless at the 
time, but when fused with other sources, may be critical.  Therefore, patrol 
debriefs are mandatory for every patrol that occurs.   
2. Gain Immediate Dominance - "The Neighborhood is the Front" 
Immediate dominance upon arrival into the area of operations achieves 
the psychological affect required to demonstrate competence and power.  
Dominance is established through aggressive patrolling and close interaction 
with the populace.  This approach depends upon skilled tactical unit operations at 
the squad and platoon level.  Units best trained to operate in an urban 
environment in this way are light infantry and SOF.  These units must be 
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immersed and dispersed among the population in order to establish dominance.  
Initially, control is not about hearts and minds.  It is about observing and 
understanding what transpires on the neighborhood level and then being able to 
influence what is seen.  Units operating in and around foreign neighborhoods will 
ideally be able to gain knowledge and detailed understanding through long-term 
assignment to a certain area.  While seeking to gather intelligence, units should 
utilize all traditional and non-traditional assets available to fully understand the 
local situation.189 The principles of Army Combatives serve as a useful illustration 
of this concept.   
A fighter uses the parts of his body to create a natural mechanical 
advantage over the parts of the enemy’s body.  By using leverage, a fighter can 
have a greater effect on a much larger enemy.  In this analogy, situational 
awareness gives a fighter the ability to capitalize on advantages as they present 
themselves.  According to the U.S. Army Combatives Manual, 3-25.150, “Things 
are often going on around the fighters that could have a direct impact on the 
outcome of the fight such as opportunity weapons or other personnel joining the 
fight.”190  Similarly, the counterinsurgent that becomes focused on direct action 
against the insurgent loses the ability to recognize levers that may be available. 
This principle is reinforced by misdirecting the enemy’s strengths and using 
superior technique and strategy to overcome one’s own weakness.191  In 
counterinsurgency, one’s ability to extract information from the population, to 
come to know what they know, allows the contestant to overcome its initial 
disadvantage.  Each technique has a window of effectiveness based upon the 
amount of space between the two combatants.  The combatant must control the 
distance between himself and the enemy in order to dominate the fight.192 
                                            
189 Non-traditional intelligence collection can include international police trainers and 
advisors who are working at the cities joint coordination center (JCC), the JCC itself and ISF 
intelligence reporting.  This will provide a different perspective and help prevent the unit from 
developing a view that is too narrow. 
190 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-25.150 Combatives (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2002), 1-1. 
191 FM 3-25.150, 1-1. 
192 FM 3-25.150, 1-2. 
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 The use of multiple combat outposts distributed throughout a unit’s sector 
is an effective way to achieve dominance at the neighborhood level.  Multiple 
outposts support local police and government security forces.  These outposts 
should be manned with both coalition and indigenous security forces.  Joint 
operations assist in training indigenous forces while maintaining a security 
presence at the neighborhood level.  These outposts also complement patrols 
that operate in their vicinity.  Effective small unit operations in Mosul, Ramadi, 
and Samarra demonstrated that surveillance and over-watch from concealed 
positions in the neighborhood effectively countered insurgent attacks. 
 3. Establishing Framework for Local Political Expression  
The immediate months following the invasion were a time in which the 
Iraqi population expected their lives to improve.193  Also known as the “golden 
hour”, this time period refers to the timeframe in which a benevolent occupation 
force has the opportunity to positively affect the population of a given territory.  
This is a crucial concept in the immediate aftermath of an invasion.  While many 
prefer to use the term “army of liberation”, it is important to understand that the 
locals will view a foreign “army of liberation” as an occupying army within a few 
months.  Attempting to gloss over this fact is not consistent with a population 
focused approach.  If the occupation force understands that a foreign presence is 
uncomfortable and humiliating to most people, it will recognize the need to 
immediately build strong ties with the population in order to rebuild and 
strengthen institutions.  Work at the neighborhood level is required to build 
interpersonal relationships essential to overcoming natural biases against the 
occupying force.   
Understanding the previous political system and climate of local 
government is necessary to properly establish and maintain control of a given 
area. Failing this, the liberators will lack the knowledge required to administer the 
area effectively.  In the case of Iraq, this failure led to a build-up of grievances 
within the local population and a growth in armed opposition groups.  Thus by 
                                            
193 The expectation for a better life was at least partially based on U.S. leaflets dropped over 
population centers that told Iraqis not to fight on behalf of their dictator and that the coalition was 
bringing them freedom and a better life.    
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limiting grievances, the liberating force can limit the growth of armed resistance.  
Beyond simply using the minimum force required with maximum precision, 
control of the population is achieved through the effective establishment of a 
framework for local political expression. 
If the area being administered consists of multiple religious or ethnic 
groups who were previously held together through the coercion of a dictator, it is 
reasonable to expect that the same area will require a similar approach in the 
short term. Thus, the framework for local political expression should build upon 
the local situation and seek minor improvements in individual freedom.  The 
government’s monopoly on the use of violence must be maintained, and since 
the transition from coercion to consensus is a gradual one, the political 
framework established should not be totally foreign.  
4. Trust, Confidence, and Governance at the Neighborhood Level 
The population’s trust in government is critical to counterinsurgency 
operations. Trust in government reflects the population’s assessment of the 
government’s ability to provide security and basic services.  The population 
determines its level of trust based on its assessment of the government’s 
reputation, performance, and appearance.  Initially, the population will likely trust 
the government and its efforts.  However, if the government fails to meet the 
population’s expectations, it will lose the population’s trust. 
Units build trust with the population through consistency and delivery on 
promises.  The ability of the counterinsurgency to protect the population is 
paramount; therefore, security at the neighborhood level provides the foundation 
for the counterinsurgent’s ability to build trust.   In Iraq, when locals believed that 
they would not become victims of reprisals, they became more comfortable 
giving information about the insurgency.  Information collection became difficult in 
instances where units could not provide security. 
5. Establish Joint Coordination Centers  
Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) established and supported by both 
coalition and host nation leadership have been successful during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.   The purpose of building and maintaining JCCs in an area of operation 
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is to combine joint, interagency, and Coalition Forces with local security forces in 
order to bring together all available resources to “fight crime, terrorism, and 
protect the population.”194 By definition, JCCs enhance coordination, 
management and synchronization of available resources. The centers in each of 
the districts in Iraq have been able to combine the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, 
Facility Protection Services, Iraqi Fire Departments and hospitals with an 
operational relationship with coalition forces.   JCCs allow for an increased ability 
to protect the population, a must in COIN operations.   JCCs combine leadership 
and Command and Control (C2) of police and military to ensure support for local 
security forces when needed.  They are able to combine city and provincial 
governmental services to capitalize on issues at the local level.  The JCC gives 
city mayors a voice in security matters and enables police chiefs and other 
security officials to respond to city mayor directives.195  Nineveh Governor 
Osama Kashmoula, when commenting on the first JCC opened in Mosul, stated, 
“This state-of-the-art facility will change how we communicate and handle 
security problems [and] this is the first time in the history of Iraq that we have had 
a facility where all of the security forces are in one building working together to 
provide security.”196  
JCCs help to ensure that a single political and military approach in COIN 
is maintained.  Components of JCCs in Iraq are akin to most military operations 
centers - radio communication equipment, maps, computers, and telephones.   
As with most operations centers, JCCs must have operations and intelligence 
                                            
194 CENTCOM, “Iraqi Security Forces Open the First JCC in Northern Iraq (Joint 
Coordination Center)”, June 26, 2004, 
http://www.centcom.mil/CentcomNews/Stories/06_04/12.htm (accessed on October 26, 2006). 
195 Steven M. Miska, “Growing the Iraqi Security Forces”, Military Review, July-August 
(2005).  The author states that the JCC is part of city government, but because the Iraqi kada 
(county) system that stovepipes funding from Baghdad to provincial ministries, city governments 
have little control over purse strings. Lacking fiscal authority, city mayors must petition county 
ministries to provide resources for city security and economic progress. 
196 CENTCOM, “Iraqi Security Forces Open the First JCC in Northern Iraq (Joint 
Coordination Center)”, June 26, 2004, 
http://www.centcom.mil/CentcomNews/Stories/06_04/12.htm (accessed on October 26, 2006). 
  
95 
functions.  JCCs are one of the best places to fuse the intelligence from Joint 
patrols of Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces along with local police.   The 
JCCs are networked together across the AOs, but their focus must be local.  
They must be located in the city they serve and not on adjacent military bases.   
6. Eliminate Sources of External Support to Insurgent 
The elimination of external sources of insurgent support and safe havens 
must be initiated once ties and trust have been instituted with the local 
population.  The elimination of insurgent support is necessary prior to direct 
action on the insurgent and his network.  Determining the insurgent infrastructure 
allows the counterinsurgent to visualize the overall state of the network he must 
disassemble.  A simple yet effective technique implemented in Mosul and 
Samarra was the creation of barriers to partition off the insurgent support base in 
each city.  Operation Petersburg in Mosul and Operation Great Wall in Samarra 
were two operations to construct walls and berms with security checkpoints and 
entry control points.  This reduced the number of possible ways insurgents could 
bring resources into the two cities.   In Mosul, the wall cut off more than 70 desert 
trails into the city used by insurgents and foreign fighters.  The wall reduced 
attacks to the lowest levels in a year [2005].197  The local governor, Governor 
Yusef Kasmallah, was able to clarify in simple, but clear terms, "Before, we were 
a house without a fence."198  During the same time period the city of Tal Afar was 
fenced off with a combination of a berm and trench to reduce entry into the city.  
Locally, this helped the Coalition Forces disrupt the insurgent infrastructure in Tal 
Afar, and thus helped to limit external support entering Mosul.  The insurgents 
had been transporting weapons and different forms of capital from Syria to Mosul 
via Tal Afar.  Colonel McMaster believes that arrests in Tal Afar and at the Syrian 
border crossing of Rabiya, as well as the seizure of money, drugs and equipment 
used to manufacture false Iraqi IDs and passports, had significantly disrupted the 
insurgency's ability to operate.199  
                                            
197 CNN transcripts, July 25, 2005, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS /0507/25 
/ywt.01.html (accessed on November 10, 2006). 
198 CNN transcripts, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS /0507/25 /ywt.01.html. 
199 H. R. McMaster, (Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, July 25, 2006. 
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7. Intelligence Reorganization and the Post-Conflict Security 
Environment  
Experts in counterinsurgency warfare assert that human intelligence 
gathering is paramount to effectively countering insurgent activity.200  Thus, 
following the collapse of Iraq’s regime and its armed forces, the human nature of 
post-conflict reconstruction required an emphasis on intelligence gathered at the 
human level.  In order to achieve this, some units adapted their intelligence 
sections to better address the problems they faced in their area of operations.  
Once assigned a constant AO, battalions were able to determine the threat 
situation in their AO better than their higher headquarters.  Due to the insecure 
nature of the three cities, military units that were trained at operating in contact 
with the enemy were able to effectively operate and interact with the populace 
outside of military FOBs.   Due to this fact, maneuver battalions and SOF (mostly 
U.S. Army Special Forces) are their own best sources for information about the 
local threat.   Based on the high volume of daily patrol reporting, battalions who 
best understood their areas of operation were those who internally reorganized to 
more robustly resource their own intelligence sections.201   
The attachment of tactical HUMINT teams down to battalion level was 
beneficial to battalion intelligence reorganization. Unfortunately, these teams 
were less able to develop an “on the ground’ awareness of the area of operations 
than patrols that operated in zone daily.  Several company commanders cited 
inaccurate intelligence that negatively impacted unit relations with the local 
community.202  The inaccurate intelligence was attributed to poor situational 
awareness within the AO as a result of less operational time outside the Forward 
Operating Base.   Furthermore, THTs require psychological maturity to deal with 
older possible contacts whose motives and truthfulness are unclear.  Therefore, 
                                            
200 This tenet is cited by counter-insurgency experts such as David Galula in 
Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Kilcullen in Twenty-Eight Articles, and Kalev Sepp in 
Counterinsurgency Best Practices. 
201 Todd McCaffrey, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with authors, May 17, 
2006, and Lieutenant Colonel Erik Kurilla’s “Intelligence Reorganization in COIN”. 
202 Based on interviews with company commanders and field grade officers from the 82nd 
Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). 
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Soldiers assigned to perform this duty need to be mature and experienced 
individuals.  One possible solution cited by combat leaders is to select and train 
NCOs from the combat arms to perform this duty.   Their previous experience 
and maturity would significantly augment the current available capability.  
Examples from the Australian and British Armies demonstrate that this technique 
is a viable one.  These two Armies select soldiers who have already served in 
other units.  This provides their intelligence community with more mature and 
tactically skilled soldiers to work as human intelligence collectors. 
The highly distributed and dynamic nature of the counterinsurgency 
environment requires decentralized intelligence gathering in every area of 
operation.   Furthermore, the constantly changing insurgent networks inherent to 
the local environment require close and frequent interaction with the population.  
The ability to influence key insurgent members without always having to resort to 
the kill or capture option requires decentralized intelligence and operational 
fusion at the city level.  This was achieved in situations where all intelligence 
collecting assets shared their information in frequent collaborative meetings.203      
Personality differences often get in the way of intelligence fusion between 
unlike organizations and are frequently cited as an impediment to cooperation. 
This must be overcome in order to effectively deal with the networked, 
acephalous terror/insurgent organizations currently challenging U.S. interests.  In 
addition to being a more effective use of assets, close collaboration will help de-
conflict sources from one organization to another.  Multi-service/agency source 
de-confliction meetings should occur in every region where HUMINT is collected.  
A Source Management Database must be multi-service and multi-agency in 
order to be effective and efficient.  It is crucial to all successful intelligence 
operations that contribute to local control, because it prevents source fratricide 
and deception by threat counter-intelligence efforts.  Furthermore, source de-
                                            
203 Todd McCaffery, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, May 17, 
2006.  See also Michael Gibler, personal recorded interview. June 8, 2006. [Digital recording 
done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS]. 
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confliction ensures more accurate situational awareness at the local level and 
ensures greater efficiency.    
The disparate missions of the organizations involved in HUMINT fusion 
have a significant impact on its efficiency.  While the U.S. Army battalion or 
brigade operating in a city may be supporting the local government in order to 
control and support the population, other organizations and agencies in the city 
may have narrower mission statements that, without close communication and 
coordination, could adversely effect the larger mission.  These two mission 
statements may not seamlessly integrate into effective collective action.  
Furthermore, while one organization’s commitment to the problem of Iraq 
ensures individual and unit participation of a year, other organizations limit 
individual and/or unit participation to three to seven months.  This national 
inconsistency across the organizations working together in Iraq is not 
demonstrative of best practices.   
As a result of this inconsistency, individuals and units are constantly 
training new people and/or getting to know new personalities involved in the 
mission.  This frequent rotation of personnel and organizations make effective 
problem solving within a foreign cultural context nearly impossible.  As an 
example at the individual level, an intelligence analyst needs several months to 
gain situational awareness of an area.  If the analyst departs in the next four 
months, the new analyst must go through the same process.  Multiplying this 
process over several years shows how organizations are likely operating below 
their potential.  Furthermore, the bureaucratic pressure created by budget 
competition means that organizations are more likely to seek credit for discrete 
success than agree to compromise in ways that help ameliorate long term 
problems.  These problems also affected human intelligence collection in Korea 
and Vietnam.  A failure to develop workable solutions may result in similar 
outcomes that characterized these previous campaigns.  Based on insights 
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gleaned from Israeli intelligence activities, the United States must “get serious … 
or suffer the strategic consequences.”204  
8. Immediately Build or Enable Local Security Forces 
Successful control at the local level is best achieved in cooperation with 
local security forces.  In Mosul, two battalions of the U.S. Army were committed 
to working immediately with the local police and civil defense corps.  This effort 
was instrumental in the development of relative security in Mosul in 2003.205  Yet 
due to the significant troop reduction in Mosul in 2004, the ability to partner with 
and advise the local security forces was also greatly reduced.  Iraqi police 
performance degraded throughout the year.  In November 2004, the local 
government lost the trust and confidence of the population when the police and 
most local Army units deserted in the face of insurgent attacks.   If the local 
police and army units had had dedicated unit advisors with them, the local 
response to the surge in insurgent violence would likely have been different.206  
In Ramadi, an infantry battalion was committed to the training and advising of the 
city police.  Yet, in spite of this effort, the police failed to effectively resist 
insurgent activity when operating independent of coalition forces.207   This result 
is consistent with the experiences in the other two cities.  When closely backed 
by coalition forces, Iraqi police were able to perform security tasks in city 
neighborhoods.  The police force’s inability to take on insurgent action when 
backup was not available suggests that police forces were not capable of 
independently defeating insurgent organizations in Iraq.  This is due to the 
vulnerability inherent to police forces that operate in the city.  Within the local 
                                            
204 Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Roy Godson, “Intelligence Dominance: A better way forward in 
Iraq”, The Weekly Standard, July 31, 2006, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/faculty/shultz/pdf/ 
IntelligenceDominance.pdf 
205 According to Brigadier General Joe Anderson, 2nd BCT (+) would not have been able to 
succeed in Mosul had they not had the 503rd military police battalion attached.  This MP battalion 
partnered with the local police in order to create a neighborhood police capability able to protect 
the population and be proactive.   
206 This assessment is a result of interviews with officers serving in Mosul and the authors’ 
judgment based on the reporting and coordination routinely performed by advisors operating with 
local security forces. 
207 Thomas Neemeyer, personal recorded interview, December 2, 2005. [Digital recording 
done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS]. 
100 
social context, they are known to the community and are constantly exposed. 
This exposes their families and makes direct action against hidden insurgent 
groups dangerous.   Local police can therefore only effectively operate in a lethal 
insurgency when they have backup at the local level by army or national police 
forces.  This backup is necessary for years, not months.  National forces that 
come for a short while to perform a few raids will not provide the long term 
assistance needed to establish full government control.        
The training and equipping of a national army that the United States wants 
to maintain as an ally should receive the best our country has to offer.   In the 
case of Iraq’s army and police forces, the effort was initially out-sourced to 
civilian corporations.  This decision reflects an assumption that the security 
environment in Iraq would be permissive, and that the civilian outsourcing of 
foreign military training used in Bosnia and Kosovo would also work in Iraq.   This 
assumption proved incorrect.  Some equipment supplied to the new Iraqi Army 
by these civilian companies was substandard.   In addition, the training provided 
to Iraqi police was based on western police techniques used in stable western 
cities.  It was not until these deficiencies were corrected in the summer of 2004, 
that the national effort to train and equip Iraqi Security forces began to achieve 
effective results.   Providing advisory teams to host nation military and police 
units was an initiative that satisfied the requirement previously executed by Army 
and Marine battalions as an additional duty.  While this was a positive and 
necessary step, effective teams arrived many months after they were needed.208 
Due to Iraq’s security situation, the ability to advise local security forces 
with deployable teams capable of living and fighting with their assigned unit is a 
required capability for effective development of local security forces. 
                                            
208 Several battalions of the new Iraqi army refused to deploy to Falluja in April 2004. This 
indicated that the effort to train and equip the new Iraqi army was not going well.  The subsequent 
reorganization of the effort to train and equip ISF led to the creation of the Multi-national Security 
Transition Command- Iraq.  Improvement in training and equipping was achieved by the fall.  The 
effort to provide fully trained and manned advisory teams did materialize until the summer of 
2005.  This is partially due to organizational inertia in DoD.  The mission to train and advise 
foreign armies was previously the job of U.S. Army Special Forces.  When U.S. Army SF did not 
receive the mission to do this in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines had to 
generate this capability from scratch.    
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Furthermore, partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi units need to become true 
partnerships.  In spite of maneuver battalions’ desire for unilateral action, the 
nature of counter-insurgency requires an approach that is by, with, and through 
the local population.  This is achieved through constant partnership at the 
neighborhood police station level.  It is at this level that the insurgency 
intimidates the local government, and therefore is where day and night soldier 
interaction with local security forces must occur.209   Independent Coalition action 
in Iraq fails to enable local security forces.   Indigenous security forces know the 
population and the language better than any American Soldier or Marine.  Thus, 
all Coalition activity should be focused on enabling the host nation to solve its 
own security problems.    
 
B. APPROACHES THAT FAILED TO ACHIEVE CONTROL 
The failure to achieve control of a town or city can be described as a 
failure to see what is happening at the neighborhood level and thus the inability 
to completely influence the people in the neighborhood.  Approaches that fail to 
achieve control are those that do not build strong ties with the population.  The 
inability to build strong ties indicates a failure to take actions that influence the 
population’s perceptions and expectations.  Based on case studies of Mosul, 
Ramadi and Samarra from 2003 to 2005, the following approaches prevented 
units from establishing control over and protection of the population.   
1. Inconsistent and Excessive Application of Force 
 COIN operations are best implemented within the framework of a 
centralized strategic plan with decentralized execution at the tactical level.  The 
campaign plan must call for control mechanisms within security forces to allow 
for decentralized execution. Control mechanisms call for consistency in 
application of force and military power in the post-invasion timeframe to establish 
trust from the population.  De-centralized execution, by default, allows for some 
inconsistencies, but it is in a controlled state.  Inconsistencies and excessiveness 
                                            
209 Pat Roberson, (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army), in discussion with the authors, August 
10, 2006.  See also: Adrian Bogart III, “The 9 Principles of Combined Arms Actions in a 
Counterinsurgency Environment”, Military Review, March-April (2006). 
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include harsh rules of Engagement (ROE) that are not focused on protecting the 
population, but rather are established to protect the force.  Other examples of 
excessiveness include fire support in an urban environment for the sole purpose 
of a ‘show of force’, or terrain denial missions.  Use of Fire Support and use of 
Artillery around civilian populations in a COIN environment is counter-productive; 
it is difficult to build trust and confidence when shells and bombs are exploding in 
city streets and the average civilian has no idea who fired them.  The best course 
of action is to send a man, not a bullet.  Fire support should be held in reserve 
and replaced by Soldiers, because they are less likely to cause collateral 
damage. A human is more discriminating and can provide immediate 
assessment and response at the target area.  Holding Fire Support and Artillery 
in reserve is a complete shift in thought from High Intensity Operations.  In COIN, 
“destruction is applied only to the extent necessary to achieve control and, thus, 
by its nature, must be discriminating.”210      
In order for the centralized plan to be consistent within each city, the area 
of operations must have a comprehensive city specific plan that is established 
with the population in mind. The decentralized execution allows for adjustments 
at the local level.   The plans must not be based on the unit that is responsible for 
providing a safe and secure environment, but must meet the individual nuances 
of the local environment.  Any refinement to the plan must come from the local 
level.  This methodology must be in place from the beginning. 
 Implementing a national policy that doesn’t fit into the natural order of the 
local environment will not work.  One of the earliest examples of this failure is 
when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) dissolved the Iraqi Army – it 
created massive unemployment and disassembled one element of national unity 
that worked.  A better course of action may have been to mandate that every 
military age male join the military.  By controlling this national resource, CPA and 
                                            
210 Harold K. Johnson, Parameters, Spring (1998), 93-109.  The Parameters article was 
adapted from Lewis Sorley’s Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of 
Command, As former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Johnson also wrote: “I maintain 
that control is the object beyond the battle and object beyond the war.” 
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the Iraqi Transitional Government would have had an increased ability to prevent 
insurgency and to rebuild the country.211     
2. Main Effort Focused on Killing and Capturing Insurgents 
Units in Iraq focused more on killing and capturing insurgents, and less on 
developing indigenous security forces and government institutions.  While units 
typically desire to use overwhelming fire power to achieve tactical outcomes, any 
collateral damage inflicted on the population can push it towards the side of the 
insurgency.  Therefore, it is critical to use the minimum force required to achieve 
the desired outcome.  If the operation has the potential to create more insurgents 
than will be eliminated, then the counterinsurgent should reconsider conducting 
the operation. 
 Social capital is generally referred to as the set of trust, institutions, social 
norms, social networks, and organizations that shape the interactions of actors 
within a society and are an asset for the individual and collective production of 
well-being.212  The relationships between individuals are more important than the 
individuals themselves.  Social network analysis, therefore, can identify who an 
individual is.  In COIN, a hidden insurgent is found by gaining an understanding 
of his network, or the system of relationships through which he is associated.  By 
focusing on gaining social capital, the counterinsurgent can shrink the political 
space in which the insurgent exists.   Without enough political space to operate, 
the insurgent and his network are illuminated and can then be targeted.  If the 
counterinsurgent focuses too heavily on targeting individuals, he may never be 
able to understand the network well enough to dismantle it.   
3. Intelligence Gathering Through Detain and Release Tactics  
 Large-scale detain and release tactics designed to gain intelligence 
isolated the population and made it more difficult for units to earn the population’s 
trust. When attempting to gain trust through meeting the population’s 
expectations, perception is reality.  The population often perceived detain and 
release tactics as being indiscriminate.  These tactics contributed to enemy 
                                            
211 Anna Simmons, “Military Advisor” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
Fall 2006).  
212 Fabio Sabatini, “Social Capital Gateway,” http://www.socialcapitalgateway.org/  
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propaganda and possibly bolstered the insurgency’s recruitment efforts.  Large-
scale detain and release tactics alienated large numbers of the population and 
demonstrated an inability to target effectively.  
Questioning people, however, is not mass detention.  There are examples 
in which large numbers of civilians were held at the scene for the purpose of 
questioning after an IED detonated or other attacks had been committed.   These 
tactics are not random acts and display characteristics governed by probable 
cause and the rules of evidence.  When the counterinsurgent is living and 
operating among the population, the ability to question and observe suspicious 
people is increased.  This helps to influence members of the insurgent 
community and causes them to start looking over their shoulder.   In this way, 
fewer indiscriminant detentions occur and fewer propaganda opportunities are 
available for the insurgent.   
4. Soldier and Marine Basing out of FOBs – “Commuting to War” 
The following quote from a military officer in Samarra is emblematic of the 
wrong mentality required to establish control of the population at the local level: “I 
enjoy my 120mm proof bunker down at the FOB and the great standoff our FOB 
has to offer.”213  The safety and comfort of the FOB in no way contributes to a 
unit’s ability to influence the populace in the dynamic and distributed 
counterinsurgency environment.  Instead, units that effectively established 
control of the population distributed subordinate units into the neighborhoods 
where the populace lived and worked.  In Mosul, control of the city was achieved 
when platoons and companies operated out of combat outposts within population 
centers.   In Samarra, a Special Forces A-team was the only unit operating in the 
city during 2003 and most of 2004.  Maneuver units responsible for Samarra in 
2003 were approximately 30 km from the city, while during the first half of 2004, 
units were still separated from the city by approximately 10 km.  Due to its 
location in the city, the ODA was able to gather the most accurate and detailed 
HUMINT of the local situation.  In Ramadi during 2003, units operated mainly 
from two FOBs in north central and North West Ramadi.  By the beginning of 
                                            
213 Anonymous military officer serving in Samarra during 2003. 
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2004, coalition units in Ramadi occupied combat outposts along the main supply 
route through the city.  While security of the MSR was the main catalyst for this 
move, the result was beneficial to local security of the population.  In all three 
cities, units that operated with squads in mutual support or with platoons in 
mutual support, often employed from neighborhood police stations, were best 
able to bring security to neighborhoods.  In doing so, they were also able to 
reduce the IED threat faced when “commuting to war” from an FOB.214   
The higher percentage of casualties caused by IEDs and indirect fire 
resulted from insurgent preferences that avoided direct fire confrontation with 
coalition combat units.  This is a manifestation of the inherent advantages extant 
in the counterinsurgency environment.  With the firepower advantage firmly in the 
hands of Coalition Forces, the insurgent will seek to attack using methods that 
maximize his information advantage.215   Thus, the local knowledge gained by 
the insurgent’s auxiliary members in the neighborhood allows insurgents to 
accurately target the Coalition, ISF and Iraqi Government officials.  In order to 
counter this existing condition, units employed squads and platoons in the 
contested area in order to improve upon their information disadvantage.  In doing 
this, they were also able to counter insurgent propaganda that challenged the 
Coalition’s willingness to confront insurgent groups in the neighborhood.  Once 
established in city neighborhoods, insurgent groups were forced to take action 
against the Coalition encroachment into their area. This was beneficial to 
Coalition forces and often resulted in successful engagements between insurgent 
groups and Coalition and local security forces.  The willingness to establish small 
unit combat outposts in support of local security forces was a characteristic of 
units that effectively partnered and supported local Iraqi government. 
From the perspective of the Iraqi civilian living in the neighborhood, a unit 
operating from an FOB outside of town moves in and out of his area a few times 
every week.  The Iraqi citizen living in a city neighborhood may have a pure 
                                            
214 This approach requires considerable cultural understanding and linguistic support.  Until 
soldiers working with the indigenous forces are linguistically capable, interpreters are essential to 
Iraqi and Coalition cooperation. 
215 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” 
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preference in favor of the new government of Iraq.  Yet, due to the transient 
nature of Coalition Forces and the institutionally weak Iraqi police, insurgent 
groups in the area are able to influence the citizen to resist his pure preference 
and not support the local government efforts to identify local insurgents and their 
active supporters.  In order to establish security at the neighborhood level, the 
counterinsurgent must reside in the area. Once a constant presence in the 
neighborhoods is established, the counterinsurgent can begin to influence the 
local population and determine who is opposed to the government.        
An analogy comparing the battlefield environment of high intensity conflict 
with that of the counterinsurgency battlefield is useful in focusing leader and unit 
activities.  In high intensity conflict where maneuver units operate at the front and 
support units bring forward material to the Brigade Support Area (BSA), combat 
leaders and units are expected to operate and live at the front.  Only on specific 
re-supply and administrative missions are leaders and units authorized to return 
to the BSA.  In a counterinsurgency environment, the neighborhood is the front 
and the Forward Operating Base (FOB) is the BSA.  Units must have the tactical, 
logistical and cultural skill to operate in platoon and company combat outposts in 
order to effectively establish local control of the population unilaterally, or in 
support of local government and security forces.  This focus at the neighborhood 
level helps to achieve control, because units that operate in the area where they 
live are able to establish better situational awareness and interpersonal ties with 
the community in which they operate.  The extent to which units are able to 
successfully attain complete situational awareness and strong interpersonal ties 
to key community leaders at the local level is dependant upon three factors 
addressed earlier in this analysis.  These three factors include a unit’s cultural 
and linguistic expertise, as well as the unit’s ability to help achieve consensus 
and apply coercive incentives to influence the population.    
With respect to operating close to the population in urban terrain, the 
suicide bomber is a major threat that warrants special attention.  Coalition and 
Iraqi security force bases and outposts are now well protected against these 
attacks. Inevitably, suicide bombers can easily attack soft targets and civilian 
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gathering places that lack the concrete barriers and security inherent to 
government or military places. Since local security forces and the Coalition 
cannot physically protect every government location and civilian gathering place, 
the requirement to establish and achieve intelligence dominance at the 
neighborhood level becomes more greatly apparent.  In spite of this threat, units 
that effectively established control of the population at the neighborhood level did 
so from within the city.   
5. Reducing Support to Local Security Forces before they are 
Capable of Controlling and Protecting the Population 
Independently  
The post-conflict security environment in the three cities was handled 
differently by each respective unit. In Mosul, a large population center was 
identified as being important enough to warrant a reinforced brigade to stabilize 
it.  Once in the city, the division headquarters and reinforced brigade were able to 
establish control over the city through an approach that worked closely with the 
local population and utilized precise application of the minimum force required.  
Due to the successful progress made during 2003, the city’s complement of 
Coalition forces was reduced by one-third for 2004.  By January of 2005, the city 
required an increase in Coalition and Iraqi security forces that exceeded the 
numbers operating there in 2003.  This example highlights the need to avoid 
declaring victory too soon.  In short, the initial victory was attained with the defeat 
of Saddam’s Armed Forces.  The transition to Iraqi sovereignty and control of its 
own territory is a process that takes time and is event driven.   
In Ramadi and Samarra, the unit headquarters responsible for each city 
had additional priorities that focused the unit’s attention away from these two 
cities.  The unit responsible for Ramadi was focused on the vast stretches of 
western Anbar Province and the Syrian border.  In Samarra, the unit responsible 
was focused on other cities deemed more important, as well as on the capture of 
national high value targets.  These conflicting priorities forced each headquarters 
to assign sub-ordinate units that it could spare with economy of force missions to 
administer these two cities as effectively as possible.  The negative results of this 
approach became apparent in the spring of 2004.  The inability to successfully 
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achieve control in these cities was not a failure of the units that operated there.  
While they may have lacked a complete understanding of the how to control and 
protect the population within an urban setting, success was not likely even if they 
had possessed this understanding.  It is necessary that the implementing force is 
equipped with adequate cultural and linguistic knowledge in order to adequately 
comprehend the task.  Furthermore, units lacked adequate force to develop the 
interpersonal ties at the neighborhood level and partner with local security forces. 
Because of this, units were not able to reach enough of the local security force or 
population to make a difference. 
The uncertainty inherent in post-conflict environments requires that 
additional force be on-hand to deal with unforeseen threats. The need for 
economy of force missions in Ramadi and Samarra demonstrates that they had 
inadequate forces to effectively administer population centers and partner with 
their respective local security forces.  The force ratio in Mosul during 2003 was 
approximately 6-per-1000.  In Ramadi during 2003, it was approximately 2-per-
1000.  In Samarra this same year it was approximately 2-per-1000, if one 
includes the battalion that was responsible for Samarra.216 These ratios are 
significantly less than those utilized in other post-conflict environments.  While 
Bosnia and Kosovo were supported with troop densities of over 20-per-1000, Iraq 
was supported with troop densities exemplified by these three cities.  
                                            
216 The unit responsible for Samarra was located 30 kilometers outside the city.  The only 
Coalition unit that lived in the city during 2003 was an SF ODA team. 
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C.  CONCLUSION 
 “Control is the object beyond the battle and object beyond the war.” 
      - General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of  
      Staff of the Army (1964-1968) 
 
This study concludes that counterinsurgency operations during OIF1, 
OIF2, and OIF3 did not persistently apply the locally appropriate approach to 
successfully control and protect the population.  Based on case studies of Mosul, 
Ramadi, and Samarra from 2003 through 2005, the authors have identified 
successful and unsuccessful approaches used to gain control of and protect the 
population.     
 Units that conducted operations that focused on the population, gained 
immediate dominance at the neighborhood level, enabled a framework for local 
political expression, built trust and confidence in government at the neighborhood 
level, established Joint Coordination Centers, eliminated external support to 
insurgents, reorganized their intelligence gathering and fusion apparatus, and 
immediately built or enabled local security forces, generally had more success in 
controlling and protecting the population.   
 Units that inconsistently and excessively applied force, focused operations 
on killing and capturing insurgents, reduced support to local security forces 
before they were capable of controlling and protecting the population 
independently, attempted to gain intelligence through detain and release tactics, 
and conducted operations from consolidated Forward Operating Bases located 
outside of the city, generally had more difficulty in controlling and protecting the 
population. 
 Protection and control of the population within the rule of law is paramount 
to counterinsurgency operations. It is through this approach that the 
counterinsurgent can gain the information it needs to defeat the insurgency.  By 
doing so, the people will be protected and willing to aid the government with the 
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